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VIIIOverview
This dissertation consists of three chapters. The ﬁrst two chapters in-
vestigate the real eﬀects of inﬂation and the third chapter the role of child
care for fertility and female female labor supply.
Chapter 1 introduces a generalized panel threshold model to analyze the
relation between inﬂation and economic growth for a sample of developing
countries. It is demonstrated that allowing for regime intercepts can be
crucial for obtaining unbiased estimates of both, inﬂation thresholds and
its marginal eﬀects on growth in the various regimes. The empirical results
conﬁrm that the omitted variable bias of standard panel threshold models
can be statistically and economically signiﬁcant.2
Chapter 2, which is joined work with Dieter Nautz, investigates the
impact of inﬂation on relative price variability (RPV) as a further important
channel of the real eﬀects of inﬂation. With a view to the recent debate on
the Fed’s implicit lower and upper bounds of its inﬂation objective, the
econometric model introduced in Chapter 1 is used to explore the inﬂation-
RPV linkage in U.S. cities.
Chapter 3 investigates the relationship between fertility, female labor
supply and child care in the context of a life cycle model for Germany. A
particular emphasis is placed on the diﬀerences between West and East Ger-
many. Counterfactual policy experiments mimicking recent policy reforms
on maternal leave and the provision of subsidized child care are conducted
with a structurally estimated version of the model.
2In a joint paper with Dieter Nautz and Stephanie Kremer, which is not enclosed in
the dissertation, the threshold model is extended to a dynamic panel setting.
IXDeutsche Zusammenfassung
Einleitung Die Dissertation besteht aus drei Kapiteln, die sich in zwei
Themengebiete einteilen lassen.
Im ersten Themengebiet werden die realen Eﬀekte von Inﬂation mittels
eines Schwellenwert-Modells untersucht. In Kapitel 1 wird eine Verallge-
meinerung des Schwellenwert-Modells von Hansen (1999) eingef¨ uhrt, womit
anschliessend der nicht-lineare Einﬂuss von Inﬂation auf das
Wirtschaftswachstum gesch¨ atzt wird. Im zweiten Kapitel, das in Ko-
Autorenschaft mit Dieter Nautz entstand, wird diese Methodik auf den
Zusammenhang von Inﬂation und der Variabilit¨ at relativer Preise ange-
wandt. In einem weiteren dieser Dissertation nicht beigef¨ ugten Artikel wird
die Analyse aus Kapitel 1 bez¨ uglich der Wirkung von Inﬂation auf Wach-
stum im Rahmen eines dynamischen Panel Schwellenwert-Modells vertieft
und weitergef¨ uhrt.
Das zweite Themengebiet der Dissertation und gleichzeitig dritte Kapitel
untersucht den Zusammenhang von Fertilit¨ at, Frauenerwerbst¨ atigkeit und
Kinderbetreuung im Rahmen eines Lebenszyklus-Modells f¨ ur Deutschland,
mit besonderem Augenmerk auf die Unterschiede zwischen West- und Ost-
deutschland.
Kapitel 1 diskutiert eine Verallgemeinerung des von Hansen (1999)
eingef¨ uhrten Schwellenwert-Modells, angewandt auf den nicht-linearen
Zusammenhang zwischen Inﬂation und Wachstum.
Wirtschaftliches Wachstum und niedrige Inﬂationsraten sind zwei der
zentralen Ziele makro¨ okonomischer Politik. Der Zusammenhang dieser bei-
den Variablen war Gegenstand vieler empirischer Arbeiten in der j¨ ungeren
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Vergangenheit, jedoch ohne eindeutige Ergebnisse. Fisher (1993) identi-
ﬁzierte als erster einen nicht-linearen Zusammenhang, wobei niedrige Inﬂa-
tionsraten einen positiven und hohe Inﬂationsraten einen negativen Wach-
stumseﬀekt haben. Bruno and Easterly (1998) best¨ atigten den negativen
Eﬀekt, bezweifelten jedoch den wachstumsf¨ orderenden Eﬀekt von niedriger
Inﬂation. Die Studie von Khan and Senhadji (2001) unterst¨ utzt dieses
Ergebnis. Sie sch¨ atzen einen Inﬂations-Schwellenwert von 11% f¨ ur Entwick-
lungsl¨ ander, wobei Inﬂationsraten unterhalb des Schwellenwerts keinen sig-
niﬁkanten Einﬂuss auf das Wirtschaftswachstum haben, w¨ ahrend hingegen
Inﬂationsraten oberhalb von 11% einen signiﬁkanten wachstumsmindernden
Eﬀekt haben. Mittels einer Verallgemeinerung des Schwellenwert-Modells
von Hansen (1999) pr¨ asentiere ich neue Ergebnisse f¨ ur den nicht-linearen
Zusammenhang von Inﬂation und Writschaftswachstum.
Hansen (1999) entwickelt ein Schwellenwert-Modell und die dazugeh¨ orige
asymptotische Theorie f¨ ur Panel Daten mit individuellen Eﬀekten, welches
es erlaubt, sowohl die Schwellenwerte zu sch¨ atzen als auch auf deren statistis-
che Signiﬁkanz zu testen. Aufgrund der notwendigen Bereinigung um den in-
dividuellen Eﬀekt, ist es nicht m¨ oglich in jedes der durch die Schwellenwerte
getrennten Regime eine Konstante aufzunehmen, wie es in Schwellenwert-
Modellen f¨ ur Zeitreihen- oder Querschnittsdaten ¨ ublich ist. Da in Hansen
(1999) die Entwicklung der Methodik und Asymptotik an sich im Vorder-
grund steht, geht er auf dieses Problem nicht ein. Jedoch l¨ aßt sich ein-
fach f¨ ur Unterschiede in den regimespeziﬁschen Konstanten kontrollieren,
in dem in jedes Regime, bis auf eines, eine Konstante eingef¨ uhrt wird.
Diese Konstanten werden bei der Bereinigung der individuellen Eﬀekte somit
nicht eliminiert und das von Hansen (1999) eingef¨ uhrte Sch¨ atzverfahren
bleibt bei geringf¨ ugigen Modiﬁkationen weiterhin anwendbar. Wie im Fol-
genden dargestellt werden soll, kann diese Verallgemeinerung sowohl theo-
retisch als auch in empirischen Anwendungen entscheidenden Einﬂuss auf
die Sch¨ atzergebnisse haben. Ohne Beschr¨ ankung der Allgemeinheit des
Ergebnisses zeige ich f¨ ur ein vereinfachendes Beispiel, dass es im Falle von
Schwellenwert-Modellen zu verzerrten Sch¨ atzern der linearen Eﬀekte in den
einzelnen Regimen kommen kann, wenn Unterschiede in den regimespeziﬁs-
chen Konstanten vorliegen. Dies ist insofern nicht ¨ uberraschend, da jede in
einer Sch¨ atzung vernachl¨ assigte Variable, die sowohl mit der zu erkl¨ arenden
als auch einer der erkl¨ arenden Variablen korreliert ist, zu einer verzerrten
Sch¨ atzung dieser Regressionskoeﬃzienten f¨ uhrt, dem sogenannten “Omitted
Variable Bias”. Die Verzerrung des Sch¨ atzers der linearen Eﬀekte ist propor-
tional zu der Gr¨ oße des vernachl¨ assigten Unterschiedes in den regimespeziﬁs-
chen Konstanten, da die Orthogonalit¨ at der Regressoren in den verschiede-
nen Regimen nicht bewahrt wird. Im Rahmen des Schwellenwert-Modells
von Hansen (1999) zieht dies jedoch noch weitere Konsequenzen nach sich,
da sowohl die Sch¨ atzung des Schwellenwerts als auch der Test auf statistische
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ﬁzienten abh¨ angt. Am Beispiel des Zusammenhangs zwischen Inﬂation und
Wachstum zeige ich die Bedeutung der korrekten Speziﬁzierung des Modells
von Hansen (1999) auf.
Untersuchungsgegenstand ist ein Panel von 40 Entwicklungsl¨ andern f¨ ur
die Zeitperiode 1960 bis 2004, wobei wie ¨ ublich in der empirischen Wachs-
tumstheorie F¨ unf-Jahres-Durchschnitte gebildet werden, um
Konjunkturschwankungen zu gl¨ atten. Das Original-Modell von
Hansen (1999) sch¨ atzt einen signiﬁkanten Schwellwert in H¨ ohe von 19%.
W¨ ahrend Inﬂationsraten unterhalb dieses Schwellenwertes einen positiven
Wachstumseﬀekt auf dem 10% Signiﬁkanzniveau aufweisen, l¨ asst sich zwar
ein negativer, jedoch statistisch nicht signiﬁkanter Eﬀekt von Inﬂationsraten
gr¨ oßer als 19% ﬁnden. Unter Ber¨ ucksichtigung einer regimespeziﬁschen Kon-
stanten, wird ebenfalls ein signiﬁkanter Schwellenwert gesch¨ atzt, der jedoch
nur bei 12% liegt. Im Vergleich zur ersten Sch¨ atzung sind nun beide regime-
speziﬁschen linearen Eﬀekte auf dem 1% Niveau signiﬁkant und doppelt
so hoch wie in der vorherigen Sch¨ atzung. Die regimespeziﬁsche Konstante
ist ebenfalls auf dem 1% Niveau signiﬁkant. Aus Sicht der Geldpolitik hat
dies drastische Implikationen: Im Vergleich zur urspr¨ unglichen Sch¨ atzung
sind die wachstumsf¨ ordernden Eﬀekte zweimal so groß, allerdings nur bis zu
einem um 7% geringeren Schwellenwert. Des Weiteren verringern Inﬂation-
sraten oberhalb des Schwellenwerts das Wirtschaftswachstum in signiﬁkan-
ter Weise. Diese Argumentation triﬀt auch zu, wenn als konservative An-
nahme die unteren Grenzen der 95% Konﬁdenzintervalle der Schwellenwert-
Sch¨ atzer gew¨ ahlt werden.
Abschliessend l¨ asst sich festhalten, dass die von mir vorgeschlagene Ver-
allgemeinerung des Modells in empirischen Anwendungen zu wichtigen Un-
terschieden in den Sch¨ atzergebnissen und Politikempfehlungen f¨ uhren kann.
Kapitel 2 setzt sich ebenso wie das erste mit den realen Eﬀekten von
Inﬂation auseinander und ist in Ko-Autorenschaft mit Dieter Nautz ent-
standen. Untersuchungsgegenstand ist jedoch der nicht-lineaere Einﬂuss auf
die Variablit¨ at relativer Preise (RPV).
Aus theoretischer Sicht wird ein Zusammenhang von Inﬂation und RPV
mit Menu-Kosten und Unsicherheiten ¨ uber das aktuelle Preisniveau
begr¨ undet, wobei in beiden F¨ allen Inﬂation RPV erh¨ oht und somit den Infor-
mationsgehalt der nominalen Preise verringert. Diese theoretischen Zusam-
menh¨ ange wurden in einer Vielzahl von Studien f¨ ur verschiedene L¨ ander
best¨ atigt, siehe zum Beispiel Aarstol (1999). Jedoch gibt es auch Ausnah-
men, die einen negativen oder gar keinen Einﬂuss von Inﬂation auf RPV
auﬃnden, vgl. Lastrapes (2006). W¨ ahrend sich diese Studien auf einen
linearen Zusammenhang zwischen Inﬂation und RPV beschr¨ anken, zeigen
Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003) f¨ ur die T¨ urkei und Caraballo et al. (2006)
f¨ ur Spanien und Argentinien Nicht-Linearit¨ aten in Form von Schwellen-
werten auf, welche allerdings exogen gesetzt wurden. In diesem Papier wen-Deutsche Zusammenfassung XIII
den wir das Schwellenwert-Modell von Hansen (1999) samt der in Kapi-
tel 1 beschriebenen Verallgemeinerung auf den Zusammenhang zwischen
Inﬂation und RPV in den USA an. Unser besonderes Interesse an der
m¨ oglichen Existenz von Schwellenwerten f¨ ur die USA ist begr¨ undet in der
allgemein verbreiteten Vermutung, dass die US-Amerikanische Notenbank
eine implizite Unter- und Obergrenze ihres Inﬂationsziels hat, siehe Thorn-
ton (2006). W¨ ahrend Schwellenwerte in der Beziehung zwischen Inﬂation
und RPV nicht die zunehmende Bedeutung von Inﬂationszielen in der Zen-
tralbankpraxis erkl¨ aren k¨ onnen, sollte die Identiﬁzierung solcher Schwellen-
werte jedoch n¨ utzliche Informationen ¨ uber die Lage und Breite eines Inﬂa-
tionszielbands liefern.
Die empirische Analyse wird f¨ ur 14 Metropolregionen in den USA f¨ ur den
Zeitraum von 1998 bis 2005 durchgef¨ uhrt, wobei die im zwei Monatsrhyth-
mus ver¨ oﬀentlichen Daten des US-Amerikanischen Konsumenten Preis In-
dizes (CPI) zugrunde gelegt werden. Inﬂation ist deﬁniert als die j¨ ahrliche
Ver¨ anderungsrate des CPI und RPV als die Standardabweichung der
j¨ ahrlichen Inﬂationsraten der Subkategorien des CPI um die j¨ ahrliche Inﬂa-
tionsrate, jeweils gewichtet nach der Bedeutung der einzelnen Subkategorie
im CPI. Im Gegensatz zu den vorherigen Studien liefert die Sch¨ atzung mit-
tels des um regimespeziﬁsche Konstanten erweiterten Schwellenwert-Modells
von Hansen (1999) zwei Schwellenwerte bei 1.6% und 4.2%, die ebenso statis-
tisch signiﬁkant sind wie die regimespeziﬁschen Konstanten und linearen Ef-
fekte. Inﬂationsraten unterhalb von 1.6% sind mit einem negativen Einﬂuss
auf RPV verbunden, wonach ein weiteres Absinken der Inﬂation Richtung
Deﬂation ein Ansteigen von RPV in diesem Regime bedeutet. Dies l¨ asst sich
durch die Existenz von nach unten rigiden, nominalen Preisen und L¨ ohnen
erkl¨ aren. Inﬂationsraten zwischen den beiden Schwellenwerten von 1.6% und
4.2% haben ebenso einen negativen Eﬀekt der allerdings deutlich schw¨ acher
ausf¨ allt. Inﬂationsraten gr¨ osser als 4.2% erh¨ ohen RPV wie dies von den
klassischen Theorien vorhergesagt wird, w¨ ahrend die RPV verringernden
Aspekte von Inﬂation abgeklungen sind. Die absolute St¨ arke des Eﬀekts ist
vergleichbar mit dem f¨ ur das Inﬂationsregime unterhalb von 1.2%.
Diese Ergebnisse stellen zun¨ achst einen Bezug zu den Ergebnissen
vorheriger Studien dar, in denen sowohl negative als auch positive Eﬀekte
von Inﬂation aufgezeigt werden, die jedoch abh¨ angig vom Inﬂationsniveau
sind. Des Weiteren l¨ asst sich sagen, dass die optimale Inﬂationsrate im
Bezug auf ihre Wirkung auf RPV zwischen 1.6% und 4.2% bzw. zwischen
1.8% und 2.8% liegt, wenn als konservative Annahme die Ober- bzw. Unter-
grenze der 95% Konﬁdenzintervalle des unteren bzw. oberen Schwellenwertes
als Bezugspunkte gew¨ ahlt werden. Diese Aussage beruht auf der Annahme,
dass nicht das Niveau der RPV minimiert sondern nur der Einﬂuss von In-
ﬂation auf RPV minimal sein sollte, vgl. Woodford (2003).Deutsche Zusammenfassung XIV
Kapitel 3 untersucht im Rahmen eines Lebenszyklus-Modells die Be-
deutung von bezahlter Kinderbetreuung f¨ ur das Fertilit¨ ats- und das Arbeit-
sangebotsverhalten verheirateter Frauen in Deutschland.
W¨ ahrend f¨ ur ¨ uber neunzig von hundert Kindern in der Altersgruppe von
drei bis sechseinhalb Jahren in Deutschland ein subventionierter Kinderbe-
treuungsplatz zur Verf¨ ugung steht, ist nur f¨ ur drei von hundert Kindern
im Alter von null bis zwei Jahren in Westdeutschland ein subventionierter
Kinderbetreuungsplatz vorhanden, in Ostdeutschland jedoch f¨ ur mehr als
dreißig von hundert Kindern. Nach einem erst k¨ urzlich erlassenen Gesetzen-
twurf der Bundesregierung sollen die Kinderbetreuungsangebote im Westen
bis zum Jahre 2013 auf das ostdeutsche Niveau angehoben werden. Ziel
dieser Inititative ist unter Anderem, die Erwerbsbeteiligung von M¨ uttern
mit jungen Kindern sowie die Geburtenrate zu erh¨ ohen. Da diese Maß-
nahme mit vermehrten ¨ oﬀentlichen Ausgaben verbunden ist, besteht das
Interesse, die Erfolgsaussichten dieser Initiative zu beurteilen. Dies ver-
suche ich im Rahmen eines Lebenszyklus-Modells mit endogenen Fertilit¨ ats-,
Arbeitsangebots- und Kinderbetreuungsentscheidungen.
Unter Benutzung des Sozio-¨ okonomischen Panels konstruiere ich f¨ ur die
Jahre von 1983 f¨ ur Westdeutschland bzw. 1989 f¨ ur Ostdeutschland bis 2006
Beziehungs-, Geburten- und Arbeitsangebothistorien f¨ ur Frauen sowie deren
Nutzung von Kinderbetreuung. ¨ Ahnlich wie Francesconi (2002) beziehe ich
in meine Studie nur Frauen ein, die in einer festen Partnerschaft leben.
Falls eine Frau Kinder hat, muss der aktuelle Lebenspartner auch der Vater
sein. Dieses Auswahlkritierum l¨ asst sich damit begr¨ unden, dass die meis-
ten ¨ okonomischen Theorien f¨ ur Fertilit¨ at und das weibliche Arbeitsange-
bot f¨ ur Frauen in stabilen Beziehungen entwickelt wurden. Es gilt jedoch
anzumerken, dass die Ergebnisse dieser Studie sich somit nicht auf die
Gesamtheit der (weiblichen) Bev¨ olkerung ¨ ubertragen lassen, falls unbeobacht-
bare Eigenschaften, die zu stabilen Partnerschaften f¨ uhren, mit den Geburts-
und Arbeitsangebotsentscheidungen korreliert sind. Des Weiteren liegt das
Interesse in diesem Kapitel bez¨ uglich des weiblichen Arbeitsangebots und
der Nutzung von Kinderbetreuung auf unterschiedlichen Lebensabschnitten
eines Kindes, was sich in der Deﬁnition der zugrunde gelegten Zeitperioden
und Variablen widerspiegelt.
F¨ ur die Beobachtungsstichprobe lassen sich f¨ ur Westdeutschland fol-
gende Fakten dokumentieren. Die Betreuungskosten in subventionierten
Einrichtungen sind zwei- bis viermal g¨ unstiger als in nicht-subventionierten
Einrichtungen. Jedoch ist f¨ ur Kinder im Alter von null bis zwei Jahren nur
eine geringf¨ ugige Anzahl von Betreuungspl¨ atzen verf¨ ugbar, hingegen in der
Altersgruppe von drei bis sechseinhalb Jahren f¨ ur jedes Kind. Die Nutzung
von Kinderbetreuung ist f¨ ur beide Altersgruppen ungef¨ ahr so hoch wie die
Anzahl der bereitgestellten, subventionierten Pl¨ atze. Allerdings wird in etwa
die H¨ alfte der Kinder im Alter von null bis zwei Jahren, die sich in Betreuung
beﬁnden, in nicht-subventionierten Einrichtungen betreut, ausschliesslichDeutsche Zusammenfassung XV
oder zus¨ atzlich zu subventionierter Betreuung. Des Weiteren l¨ asst sich
feststellen, dass Kinderbetreuung ebenso von nicht-erwerbst¨ atigen M¨ uttern
genutzt wird, jedoch keine Voraussetzung f¨ ur Frauen ist, um zu arbeiten. Die
große Mehrheit der erwerbst¨ atigen Frauen mit Kindern im Alter von null bis
zwei Jahren nutzt n¨ amlich keinerlei kostenpﬂichtige Kinderbetreuungsange-
bote. Die Erwerbsbeteilung von M¨ uttern steigt mit dem Alter der Kinder
stetig an, besonders stark w¨ ahrend die Kinder im nicht-schulpﬂichtigen Al-
ter sind. Im Vergleich zu Westdeutschland ist subventionierte Kinderbetreu-
ung in Ostdeutschland preisg¨ unstiger und in wesentlich gr¨ oßerem Umfang
vorhanden, insbesondere in Form von Ganztagsangeboten. Dementsprechend
ist auch die Nutzung von bezahlter Kinderbetreuung im Osten wesentlich
h¨ oher als im Westen und nicht-subventionierte Betreuung spielt in beiden
Altersgruppen eine vernachl¨ assigbare Rolle. Die Frauenerwerbst¨ atigenrate
weist bezogen auf das Kindesalter in Ostdeutschland einen ¨ ahnlichen Ver-
lauf auf wie in Westdeutschland, liegt jedoch konstant um 10 bis 20 Prozent-
punkte h¨ oher als im Westen. Abschliessend l¨ asst sich festhalten, dass in Ost-
deutschland sowohl Vollzeit-Erwerbst¨ atigkeit als auch Vollzeit-
Kinderbetreuungsnutzung ¨ uber den jeweiligen Teilzeitraten liegt, w¨ ahrend
dies im Westen genau umgekehrt ist.
Das anschliessend entwickelte Lebenszyklus-Modell mit endogenen Fer-
tilit¨ ats-, Arbeitsangebots- und Kinderbetreuungsentscheidungen
ber¨ ucksichtigt die eingeschr¨ ankte Verf¨ ugbarkeit subventionierter Betreuung
sowie die Akkumulation von Arbeitsmarkterfahrung. Das Modell wird mit
den Daten des westdeutschen Teils der Beobachtungsstichprobe mittels einer
vereinfachten simulierten Methode der Momente gesch¨ atzt. Obgleich nicht
alle Dimensionen der Daten durch das Modell erkl¨ art werden k¨ onnen, l¨ asst
sich doch von einem soliden Fit des Modells sprechen. Anschliessend wer-
den in einem Politikexperiment mit dem gesch¨ atzten Modell Daten simuliert,
wobei jedoch die westdeutschen Rahmenbedingungen bez¨ uglich
Verf¨ ugbarkeit und Preise subventionierter Betreuung sowie des Einkommens
mit den ostdeutschen Rahmenbedingungen ersetzt werden. Mit diesem Ex-
periment soll gekl¨ art werden, zu welchem Grade die Unterschiede im Erwerb-
sverhalten zwischen ost- und westdeutschen M¨ uttern durch die Unterschiede
der Rahmenbedingungen erkl¨ arbar sind. Das Ergebnis dieses Experiments
besagt, dass sich das unterschiedliche Verhalten nicht durch die Rahmenbe-
dingungen erkl¨ aren l¨ asst. Dies kann einerseits auf eine Fehlspeziﬁkation des
Modells hindeuten oder auf unterschiedliche Pr¨ aferenzen zwischen west- und
ostdeutschen Frauen, die in einem gemeinsamen Modellrahmen nicht ab-
bildbar sind. In einem weiteren Experiment wird die Betreuungskapazit¨ at
in Westdeutschland soweit ausgedehnt, dass jedem Kind ein Ganztagsbe-
treuungsplatz zur Verf¨ ugung steht. Dies f¨ uhrt zu einem starken Anstieg
der Nutzung von Kinderbetreuung, was sich als ¨ Uberschussnachfrage nach
subventionierten Betreuungspl¨ atzen interpretieren l¨ asst, w¨ ahrend das Ar-
beitsangebot und die Geburtenrate nur in sehr geringem Maße ansteigen.Deutsche Zusammenfassung XVI
Diese Ergebnisse bewegen sich jedoch auch im Rahmen anderer Studien,
vgl. Wrohlich (2006) und Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003), was wiederum die
Plausibilit¨ at des Modellrahmens unterst¨ utzt. In einem abschliessenden Ex-
periment wird noch die Wirkung des im Januar 2007 eingef¨ uhrten Eltern-
geldes untersucht, was eine Verringerung des Arbeitsangebots von M¨ uttern
mit Kindern im Alter von null bis zwei Jahren mit sich bringt, allerdings
ohne l¨ angerfristige Auswirkungen auf die Erwerbsbeteiligung. Abschliessend
werden noch einige Verbesserungsvorschl¨ age des Modells diskutiert.Chapter 1
Threshold Eﬀects of Inﬂation
on Economic Growth in
Developing Countries
1.1 Introduction
A central objective of macroeconomic policies is to foster economic growth
and to keep inﬂation on a low level. In recent years there has been substantial
empirical work on the relationship between inﬂation and growth, yet the
results have been mixed. Fisher (1993) was the ﬁrst to identify a non-linear
relationship where low inﬂation rates have a positive impact on growth which
turns negative as inﬂation increases. Bruno and Easterly (1998) conﬁrm the
ﬁnding of a negative eﬀect for high inﬂation rates but doubt the growth-
enhancing eﬀect of low inﬂation. In line with this result, Khan and Senhadji
(2001) estimate a threshold of 11% for developing countries where inﬂation
rates above this threshold are associated with a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on
growth, while inﬂation rates below 11% do not have any signiﬁcant impact.
This paper sheds new light on the inﬂation-growth nexus introducing
a natural extension of Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold model by account-
ing for regime intercepts. The empirical results conﬁrm the importance of
including a regime intercept from a statistical and economical perspective.
Once the regime intercept is included, the threshold, up to which inﬂation is
growth enhancing, decreases substantially and, more importantly, the neg-
ative impact of inﬂation above the threshold becomes signiﬁcant.
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The paper is structured as follows. The next Section reviews the panel
threshold model by Hansen (1999). Section 3 discusses the role of regime
intercepts. Section 4 introduces the data and presents the estimation results
for the inﬂation-growth nexus. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The Panel-Threshold-Model
In this Section the panel threshold model developed by Hansen (1999, 2000)
is presented. First, a single threshold model is discussed and afterwards
the case of multiple thresholds. The outline of this Section follows Hansen
(1999).
1.2.1 The Single Threshold Model
The model applies to balanced panels with n individuals and T time periods
with a scalar dependent variable yit, a scalar threshold variable qit and a k-
dimensional vector of exogenous regressors xit where i indexes the individual
and t indexes time. Thus the single threshold model takes the following form:
yit = αi + β′
1xitI(qit ≤ γ) + β′
2xitI(qit > γ) + εit, (1.1)
where I( ) is an indicator function and αi is an individual speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀect. Another representation of equation (1.1) is given by
yit = αi + β′xit(γ) + εit, (1.2)
where xit(γ) =
 
xitI(qit ≤ γ)
xitI(qit > γ)
 
and β = (β′
1 β′
2)′. The error term εit is
independent and identically distributed with zero mean and ﬁnite variance
σ2. This assumption excludes the possibility of lagged dependent variables
being part of the regressor vector xit. Neither all variables of xit need to have
diﬀerent slope coeﬃcients for the two regimes, nor has qit to be an element
of xit. The threshold divides the observations into two regimes depending
on whether the threshold variable qit is smaller or larger than the threshold
γ. β1 and β2 are the regime dependent regression slopes.Inﬂation and Growth 3
Estimation of a Single Threshold
The individual eﬀect αi is removed by applying the classical ﬁxed eﬀects
transformation. If the data and errors are ﬁrst stacked for an individual
and afterwards over all individuals (X∗ and Y ∗), the OLS estimator of β is
obtained by
ˆ β(γ) =
 
X∗(γ)′X∗(γ)
 −1 X∗(γ)′Y ∗. (1.3)
The vector of regression residuals is ˆ ε∗(γ) = Y ∗ − X∗(γ)ˆ β(γ) and the sum
of squared errors can be written as
S1(γ) = ˆ ε∗(γ)′ˆ ε∗(γ) = Y ∗′  
I − X∗(γ)′  
X∗(γ)′X∗(γ)
 −1 X∗(γ)′
 
Y ∗.
(1.4)
As proposed by Hansen (2000) the least squares estimate of γ is obtained
from minimizing (1.4), i.e.
ˆ γ = argmin
γ
S1(γ). (1.5)
Knowing ˆ γ, the slope coeﬃcient estimate is easily obtained by ˆ β = ˆ β(ˆ γ).
The residual vector is ˆ ε∗ = ˆ ε∗(ˆ γ) and the residual variance is deﬁned as
ˆ σ2 =
1
N(T − 1)
ˆ ε∗′
ˆ ε∗ =
1
N(T − 1)
S1(ˆ γ). (1.6)
Testing for a Threshold
Once the threshold level is determined, it has to be checked whether the
threshold eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant. The null hypothesis of no thresh-
old eﬀect in equation (1.1) is simply:
H0 : β1 = β2. (1.7)
Under the null the threshold is not identiﬁed implying that classical tests
have non-standard distributions. For ﬁxed eﬀects estimation Hansen (1996)
proposed a bootstrap to simulate the asymptotic distribution of the likeli-
hood ratio test. Under the null equation (1.1) boils down to
yit = αi + β′
1xit + εit, (1.8)Inﬂation and Growth 4
and can be rewritten after removing the individual speciﬁc mean as
y∗
it = β′
1x∗
it + ε∗
it. (1.9)
Estimating equation (1.9) with OLS yields ˜ β1, the residuals ˜ ε∗
it and the sum
of squared errors S0 = ˜ ε∗′
it ˜ ε∗
it. The likelihood ratio test of H0 is based on the
test statistic
F1 =
S0 − S1(ˆ γ)
ˆ σ2 , (1.10)
where ˆ σ2 is the residual variance deﬁned in (1.6). The asymptotic distri-
bution of F1 is non-standard and depends in general upon moments of the
sample and thus critical values cannot be tabulated. However with the boot-
strap procedure proposed by Hansen (1996) asymptotically valid p-values
can be constructed. The regression residuals are grouped by individual
ˆ ε∗
i = {ˆ ε∗
i1, ˆ ε∗
i2,..., ˆ ε∗
iT} and {ˆ ε∗
1, ˆ ε∗
2,..., ˆ ε∗
n} is used as the empirical distribu-
tion. In the bootstrapping procedure the regressors xit and the threshold
variable qit are taken as given and held constant. A sample of size n is
drawn with replacement from the empirical distribution to obtain a boot-
strap sample under H0 which is then used to estimate the model under H0
and H1 to calculate F1. This procedure has to be repeated a large number of
times and the percentage of draws for which the simulated statistic exceeds
the actual yields the bootstrap estimate of the asymptotic p-value for F1
under H0. If the p-value is below the critical value imposed, the null of no
threshold eﬀect is rejected.
Conﬁdence Intervals for the Threshold Estimate and Slope Coef-
ﬁcients
In the presence of a threshold eﬀect, i.e. β1  = β2, Hansen (2000) has shown
that ˆ γ is consistent for the true value γ0 of γ and follows a highly non-
standard asymptotic distribution. Therefore the conﬁdence intervals for γ
are obtained by using the likelihood ratio statistics which is given by
LR1(γ) =
S1(γ) − S1(ˆ γ)
ˆ σ2 . (1.11)
The null hypothesis H0 : γ = γ0 is rejected for large values of LR1(γ0). Valid
asymptotic conﬁdence intervals are formed by an asymptotic distribution for
T → ∞ or N → ∞, see Hansen (2000). One of the technical assumptionsInﬂation and Growth 5
needed to obtain this asymptotic distribution is
(β2 − β1) → 0 as n → 0, (1.12)
which means that the diﬀerence in the slops between the two regimes is
’small’ relative to sample size. Practically this implies that the asymptotic
approximation of the distribution of the likelihood ratio is more likely to hold
if β2 − β1 is small. However, large threshold eﬀects will be estimated quite
precisely. The inverse of the distribution function c(α) = −2ln(1−
√
1 − α)
allows to calculate the critical values, e.g. the 5% critical value is 7.35 and
the 1% critical value is 10.59. The null H0 : γ = γ0 is rejected at the
asymptotic level α if LR1(γ0) exceeds c(α). Asymptotic conﬁdence intervals
for γ are formed by the ’non-rejection-region’ of the conﬁdence level 1 − α.
This region consists of those values of γ for which LR1(γ) ≤ c(α), i.e. where
the null H0 : γ = γ0 is not rejected.
Although the estimator ˆ β = ˆ β(ˆ γ) depends on the threshold estimate ˆ γ,
Hansen (2000) shows that the inference on β can proceed as if the threshold
estimate ˆ γ were the true value. This implies that ˆ β is asymptotically normal
with the covariance matrix V which can be estimated by
  V =
 
N  
i=1
T  
t=1
x∗
it(ˆ γ)x∗
it(ˆ γ)′
 −1
ˆ σ2.
1.2.2 Multiple Thresholds
Estimation of Multiple Thresholds
As Hansen (1999) shows, the model can be easily extended to multiple
thresholds. Once the double threshold model is introduced, one can eas-
ily expand the analysis to further thresholds. Thus, the focus will be on the
double threshold model which takes the form
yit = αi + β′
1xitI(qit ≤ γ1) + β′
2xitI(γ1 < qit ≤ γ2) + β′
3xitI(γ2 < qit) + εit
(1.13)
with γ1 < γ2. Since for given (γ1,γ2) (1.13) is linear in slopes, OLS esti-
mation is applicable. As in the single threshold model, the sum of squared
residuals S(γ1,γ2) is straightforward to calculate, and is minimized by the
joint least squares estimates of (γ1,γ2). A grid search over (γ1,γ2) in orderInﬂation and Growth 6
to obtain the minimized value of S(γ1,γ2) is computationally quite expen-
sive since approximately (nT)2 regressions have to be run. Following the
multiple change point literature (see e.g. Bai (1997) or Bai and Perron
(1998)) sequential estimation is consistent. Thus in a ﬁrst step, the single
threshold model is estimated, resulting in the threshold estimate ˆ γ1 which is
the minimizer of S1(γ). Fixing the ﬁrst-stage estimate ˆ γ1, the second-stage
criterion is
Sr
2(γ2) =
 
S(ˆ γ1,γ2) if ˆ γ1 < γ2
S(γ2, ˆ γ1) if γ2 < ˆ γ1
(1.14)
and the second-stage threshold estimate is given by
ˆ γr
2 = argmin
γ2
Sr
2(γ2). (1.15)
Since in the ﬁrst-stage estimation the presence of an additional regime was
omitted, Bai (1997) has shown that the estimate ˆ γ1 is asymptotically not
eﬃcient whereas the second-stage estimate ˆ γr
2 is. Therefore Bai (1997) sug-
gests a third-stage estimation to obtain an asymptotically eﬃcient estimator
to improve ˆ γ1. Fixing the second-stage criterion, the third-stage criterion is
Sr
1(γ1) =
 
S(γ1, ˆ γr
2) if γ1 < ˆ γr
2
S(ˆ γr
2,γ1) if ˆ γr
2 < γ1
. (1.16)
and the asymptotically eﬃcient third-stage estimate for γ1 is obtained by
ˆ γr
1 = argmin
γ1
Sr
1(γ1). (1.17)
Testing for the Number of Thresholds
If the null of no threshold in the single threshold model (equation (1.1)) is
rejected, one moves on to estimate equation (1.13). Having done so, one
needs to discriminate between one or two thresholds. Using Sr
2(ˆ γr
2) with the
variance estimate ˆ σ2 = Sr
2(ˆ γr
2)/N(T − 1) an approximate likelihood ratio
test of one versus two thresholds can be obtained by
F2 =
S1(ˆ γ1) − Sr
2(ˆ γr
2)
ˆ σ2 . (1.18)
The null of one threshold is rejected in favor of two thresholds for large val-
ues of F2. Again the sampling distribution is approximated by a bootstrapInﬂation and Growth 7
procedure where the threshold variable qit and the regressors xit are ﬁxed in
the repeated bootstrap samples. The bootstrap errors are drawn from the
residuals obtained from the least squares regression of equation (1.13), i.e.
under the alternative hypothesis. The residuals are grouped by individual
ˆ ε∗
i = {ˆ ε∗
i1, ˆ ε∗
i2,..., ˆ ε∗
iT} and the sample {ˆ ε∗
1, ˆ ε∗
2,..., ˆ ε∗
n} is used as the empir-
ical distribution. n draws with replacement are taken from the empirical
distribution. Let ε
♯
i denote a generic T ×1 draw. The dependent variable y
♯
it
is generated under the null hypothesis of one threshold using the equation
y
♯
it = ˆ β′
1xitI(qit ≤ ˆ γ) + ˆ β′
2xitI(qit > ˆ γ) + ε
♯
it, (1.19)
which depends on the least square estimates ˆ β1, ˆ β2, and ˆ γ from the single
threshold model. The test statistic F2 can be calculated from the boot-
strap sample. Repeating this procedure a large number of times yields the
bootstrap p-value.
Conﬁdence Intervals for the Threshold Estimates
In analogy to the multiple change-points model (see Bai (1997)), the conﬁ-
dence intervals for the two threshold parameters are constructed in the same
way as in the single threshold case and are given by
LRr
2(γ) =
Sr
2(γ) − Sr
2(ˆ γr
2)
ˆ σ2
and
LRr
1(γ) =
Sr
1(γ) − Sr
1(ˆ γr
1)
ˆ σ2
where Sr
2(γ) and Sr
1(γ) are deﬁned in (1.14) and (1.16), respectively. Finally,
the asymptotic 1 − α conﬁdence regions for the threshold estimates are the
set of values of γ with LRr
2(γ) ≤ c(α) and LRr
1(γ) ≤ c(α), respectively.
As already mentioned, allowing for multiple thresholds is a straightfor-
ward extension of what has been described in subsection 1.2.2. Allowing
for an arbitrary number of thresholds, the number of statistically signiﬁcant
thresholds is determined by the sequential testing sequence. If the null of at
least K −1 thresholds is rejected and the null of at most K thresholds can-
not be rejected, the number of thresholds is obtained, namely K threshold
levels and K + 1 regimes.Inﬂation and Growth 8
1.3 Regime Intercepts
The role of regime intercepts will be discussed in the context of a single
threshold model, though it is straightforward to introduce them in a model
with multiple thresholds. The elimination of the individual speciﬁc eﬀect
in Equation (1.1) with the standard ﬁxed-eﬀects transformation implies for
the identiﬁcation of slope coeﬃcients β1 and β2 that the elements of xit are
neither time-invariant nor adding up to a vector of ones. This latter case
applies to regime intercepts which are usually included in each regime in
threshold models in pure cross-sectional or time-series contexts. Even in
the presence of ﬁxed-eﬀects it is possible to control for diﬀerences in the
regime intercepts by including them in all but one regime as in the following
extension of equation (1.1):
yit =  i + β′
1xitI(qit ≤ γ) + δ1I(qit ≤ γ) + β′
2xitI(qit > γ) + εit. (1.20)
This formulation assumes that the diﬀerence in the regime intercepts, rep-
resented by δ1, is not individual speciﬁc but the same for all cross-sections.
Since equation (1.20) has neither been considered by Hansen (1999) nor any
of the numerous studies, e.g. Adam and Bevan (2005), Lensink and Her-
mes (2004) or Nautz and Scharﬀ (2006), applying his methodology, it seems
worthwhile to brieﬂy discuss the role of regime intercepts for the estimation
results in the Hansen (1999) framework.
In case a regime intercept is included, as in speciﬁcation (1.20), the slope
estimates for each regime are identical to those from a regression using only
observations from the respective regime which reﬂects the orthogonality of
the regressors I(xi ≤ xm) and xiI(xi > xm).1 Omission of any variable
correlated with at least one regressor and the dependent variable causes
biased estimates, but regime intercepts are a particularly interesting case.
First, the bias can be clearly interpreted. Estimating equation (1.1) in the
presence of a regime intercept in the data generating process results in a
bias proportional to ˆ δ1 because the orthogonality of the regressors is not
preserved anymore. Second, availability of regime intercepts as regressors
is not an issue since they are as easily constructed as the regime-dependent
exogenous regressors for a given threshold.
1The exact algebraic expressions for the coeﬃcient estimates of both speciﬁcations are
given in the Appendix A.1.Inﬂation and Growth 9
Biased estimates of the regression slopes have further consequences in the
panel threshold model because the threshold estimates are also obtained by
least squares, compare Equation (1.5). Only by coincidence, these estimates
will be the same for speciﬁcations (1.1) and (1.20) if a regime intercept is
present in the data generating process. Moreover, unbiased estimates of
β1 and β2 are crucial for the test of the signiﬁcance of a threshold which
is based on the null hypothesis of equality of the two coeﬃcients, compare
Equation (1.7).
Eventually, the setup in Hansen (1999) has to be extended to allow for
regime intercepts as in equation (1.20). First, the null hypothesis to test
for the signiﬁcance of the threshold (Equation (1.7)) has to be extended
by δ1 = 0. Second, the derivation of the asymptotic distribution of the
threshold estimate now relies on the additional technical assumption that
δ1 → 0 as N → ∞. It means that the diﬀerence in the intercepts between
the two regimes is ’small’ relative to sample size which is completely analo-
gous to the assumption regarding the slope coeﬃcients, compare Equation
(1.12). Third, the proof in the appendix in Hansen (1999) now relies on
the following two expressions taking the regime intercept as an additional
regressor into account: θ′ = ((β2−β1)′ − δ1) and z′
it = (x′
it 1)C.
1.4 The Inﬂation-Growth Nexus
The relationship between inﬂation and growth is investigated for a balanced
panel of 40 developing countries through the period from 1960 to 2004. As
it is standard in the empirical growth literature, the results on the deter-
minants of long-term economic growth will be based on ﬁve-year averages.
The equation of interest is given by
∆lngdpit =  i+β1˜ πitI(˜ πit ≤ γ)+δ1I(˜ πit ≤ γ)+β2˜ πitI(˜ πit > γ)+φ′wit+εit,
(1.21)
representing a single threshold model that already includes a regime inter-
cept. The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita. The
inﬂation variable ˜ π serves as the regime-dependent regressor and thresh-
old variable and is a semi-log transformation of inﬂation with ˜ πit = πit −
1, if πit < 1 and ˜ πit = lnπit, if πit ≥ 1. Inﬂation rates smaller one are re-
scaled for the sake of continuity. Using inﬂation levels in growth regressionsInﬂation and Growth 10
implies that the marginal eﬀect of inﬂation on economic growth is indepen-
dent of the average level of inﬂation whereas the log model has the more
plausible implication that multiplicative inﬂation shocks will have identical
eﬀects. The control variables are selected in accordance with the empirical
growth literature, see e.g. Islam (1995) or Khan and Senhadji (2001), and
passed the robustness tests in Levine and Renelt (1992), and Sala-i-Martin
(1997). wit contains investment as a share of GDP (igdp), population growth
(dpop), the log of initial income per capita of the previous period (initial)
as well as the growth rate and standard deviation of terms of trade (dtot,
sdtot).
Table 1 presents the results for both speciﬁcations, i.e. without (column
1) and with (column 2) regime intercepts. The upper panel shows that
in both cases the null hypothesis of no threshold can be rejected at the 5%
signiﬁcance level, while the presence of one threshold cannot be rejected. In-
clusion of a regime intercept decreases the threshold estimate (middle panel)
from 19% to 12% and the lower bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval from
11.8% to 5.3%. The most striking point is that in absence of a regime inter-
cept, inﬂation rates below the threshold of 19% have a signiﬁcant positive
eﬀect (0.407) on growth only on the 10% signiﬁcance level, while the negative
impact (-0.232) for inﬂation rates above 19% is not statistically signiﬁcant
at all, compare the lower panel. In contrast, allowing for diﬀerences in the
regimes’ intercepts doubles the magnitude (0.785, -0.531) and establishes
signiﬁcance at least on the 5% level of the marginal impacts of inﬂation on
growth in both regimes. The regime intercept ˆ δ1 itself is also signiﬁcant on
the 5% level. Most of the regime-dependent coeﬃcients are consistent with
the implications of standard growth theory and are very similar for both
speciﬁcations. The results from the speciﬁcation with a regime intercept
are in line with those by Khan and Senhadji (2001), despite that, similarly
to Fisher (1993), low inﬂation rates (less than 12%) are associated with a
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on growth.2
2The results of Khan and Senhadji (2001) are not exactly comparable to those presented
here for two reasons. First, they use an unbalanced panel of more than 100 developing
countries from 1960 to 1998. Second, they introduce continuity at the threshold which,
though not explicitly stated, is nothing else but a nonlinear restriction on regime inter-
cepts:
∆lngdpit =  i + β1(˜ πit − γ)I(˜ πit ≤ γ) + β2(˜ πit − γ)I(˜ πit > γ) + φ
′wit + εit.
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Table 1.1: Inﬂation-Growth Nexus in Developing Countries
No regime intercepts Regime intercepts
Test for the number of thresholds: p-value
H0 : No threshold (K=0) 0.013 0.025
H0 : At most one threshold (K=1) 0.252 0.642
Threshold estimates and conﬁdence intervals
ˆ γ 19.16% 12.03%
95% conﬁdence interval [11.82%, 20.48%] [5.29%, 20.48%]
Coeﬃcient estimates from Equation (1.21)
Regime-dependent regressors
ˆ β1 0.407* 0.785***
(0.214) (0.281)
ˆ δ1 -1.985**
(1.000)
ˆ β2 -0.232 -0.531**
(0.146) (0.245)
Regime-independent regressors
initial -3.353*** -3.341***
(0.563) (0.567)
igdp 0.031 0.021
(0.041) (0.042)
dpop -0.814*** -0.646**
(0.306) (0.307)
dtot 0.014 0.002
(0.028) (0.028)
sdtot -0.054** -0.052**
(0.020) (0.020)
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses, */**/*** indicate the 10%/5%/1% sig-
niﬁcance level. Similarly to Hansen (1999), each regime has to contain at least 5% of all
observations. 1000 bootstrap replications were used to obtain the p-values to test for the
number of thresholds. By construction, the conﬁdence intervals for the threshold estimates
can be highly asymmetric.Inﬂation and Growth 12
From a policy perspective, choosing the correct speciﬁcation, i.e. con-
trolling for diﬀerences in the regime intercepts, has important implications.
First, the point estimate and lower bound of the conﬁdence interval from
which onwards inﬂation is harmful for growth are both substantially lower.
Second, the detrimental impact for inﬂation rates above the threshold turns
signiﬁcantly and doubles in magnitude. Third, keeping inﬂation below the
threshold has a stronger beneﬁcial eﬀect.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the relationship between inﬂation and economic growth
for developing countries using a generalization of Hansen’s (1999) panel
threshold model. Regime intercepts are introduced and the potential bias
of omitting these readily available regressors for both, regression slope and
threshold estimates, is discussed. The regime intercept is signiﬁcant in the
inﬂation-growth nexus and aﬀects the results in important ways.3
Appendix
A.1 Coeﬃcient Estimates
Without loss of generality assume that T = 1;  i =   ∀ i = 1,...,N; x is
scalar and x1 < x2 < ... < xm < xm+1 < ... < xN and the threshold is
known at γ = xm s.t. (1.1) and (1.20) boil down to
yi = ˜   + ˜ β1xiI(xi ≤ xm) + ˜ β2xiI(xi > xm) + εi (1.22)
and
yi =   + β1xiI(xi ≤ xm) + δ1I(xi ≤ xm) + β2xiI(xi > γ) + εi. (1.23)
discontinuity at the threshold and refers to balanced panels.
3Appendix A.2 presents the results for Hansen’s (1999) original application without
and with regime intercepts. Similar to the inﬂation-growth nexus, a threshold estimate is
changed and one of the regime slope coeﬃcients changes it’s sign once regime intercepts
are included.Inﬂation and Growth 13
The coeﬃcient estimates for speciﬁcation (1.23) are given by
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and can be expressed for speciﬁcation (1.22) in the following way
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where   β1,   β2 and   δ1 are taken from (1.24). Note that in the presence of a
ﬁxed eﬀect,     and       would correspond to the estimate of the average ﬁxed
eﬀect.
A.2 Hansen’s (1999) Application
Hansen (1999) investigates whether the presence of ﬁnancing constraints
implies that a ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow will be positively related to its investment
rate.4 As discussed in Section 1.3, regime intercepts (δ1 and δ2, fourth row)
are added to the speciﬁcation in Hansen (1999, equation 22):
Iit =  i + φ′wit + β1CFit−1I(Dit−1 ≤ γ1)
+ β2CFit−1I(γ1 < Dit−1 ≤ γ2)
+ β3CFit−1I(γ2 < Dit−1)
+ δ1I(Dit−1 ≤ γ1) + δ2I(γ1 < Dit−1 ≤ γ2) + εit,
4The dataset is available on Bruce Hansen’s webpage, as is the GAUSS code for esti-
mation and inference.Inﬂation and Growth 14
which represents a double threshold model for illustration where qit = Dit−1
and xit = CFit−1. The vector of control variables is given by
w′
it = (Qit−1,Q2
it−1,Q3
it−1,Dit−1,Qit−1Dit−1).
Let Iit be the ratio of investment to capital; Qit be the ratio of total market
value to assets; CFit−1 be the ratio of cash ﬂow to assets; and Dit be the
ratio of long-term debt to assets.
The estimation output is presented in Table 1.2. For both speciﬁcations,
i.e. without (column 1) and with (column 2) regime intercepts, the null of
two thresholds cannot be rejected (upper part of Table 1). The threshold
estimates and corresponding conﬁdence intervals are presented in the middle
part. While the lower threshold estimate, when controlling for diﬀerences
in the regime intercepts, is identical to the one presented in Hansen (1999),
the upper threshold is by a magnitude larger. Sticking to his interpretation
this implies a larger range of ﬁrms which is characterized by ’low debts’.
For ’high debt’ ﬁrms whose debt to asset ratio is above one, cash ﬂow is
now even negatively related to investment, see the bottom part of Table 3.
A possible interpretation could be that these ﬁrms need to use cash ﬂows
primarily to serve debt before pursuing further investments. The regime
intercepts themselves are highly signiﬁcant and have a substantial impact
on the results, underpinning the importance to include them.Inﬂation and Growth 15
Table 1.2: Hansen’s (1999) Application
No regime intercepts Regime intercepts
Test for the number of thresholds: p-value
H0 : No threshold (K=0) 0.000 0.000
H0 : At most one threshold (K=1) 0.017 0.000
H0 : At most two thresholds (K=2) 0.723 0.123
Threshold estimates and conﬁdence intervals
  γ1 0.0157 0.0157
95% conﬁdence interval [0.0139, 0.0181] [0.0145, 0.0181]
  γ2 0.5362 1.0006
95% conﬁdence interval [0.5305, 0.5629] [0.9109, 1.0006]
Coeﬃcient estimates of regime-dependent regressors from Equation (A.2)
Regime-dependent regressors
  β1 0.063*** 0.057***
(0.006) (0.007)
  β2 0.098*** 0.100***
(0.006) (0.006)
  β3 0.039*** -0.044**
(0.012) (0.022)
  δ1 - -0.083***
(0.011)
  δ2 - -0.088***
(0.010)
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses, */**/*** indicate the 10%/5%/1%
signiﬁcance level. The estimation setup is identical to the one described in Hansen
(1999). For brevity only the regime dependent-regressors are displayed.Chapter 2
Inﬂation Thresholds and
Relative Price Variability:
Evidence from U.S. Cities
(with Dieter Nautz)
2.1 Introduction
There is a growing consensus that inﬂation has real eﬀects on the economy
through its impact on the variability of relative prices (RPV) which in the-
oretical models are typically generated by menu costs or imperfect informa-
tion about the price level.1 In both types of model, inﬂation increases RPV
and, thus, distorts the informativeness of nominal prices. These models on
the real eﬀects of inﬂation have been very inﬂuential for recent macroeco-
nomics. In particular, in standard New-Keynesian DSGE models, increased
relative price variability is ”the root of all evil” caused by inﬂation, see
Green (2005, p.132).
In line with these theoretical predictions, several studies have provided
evidence in favor of a positive impact of inﬂation on RPV for various coun-
tries, see e.g. Parsley(1996), Debelle and Lamont (1997), Jaramillo (1999),
Aarstol (1999), Chang and Cheng (2000), Konieczny and Skrzypacz (2005),
1Given inﬂation, price adjustments or menu costs increase RPV by making it optimal
for (heterogenous) ﬁrms to change their prices infrequently even if their real prices erode,
see e.g. Rotemberg (1983). In incomplete information models introduced by Lucas (1973),
noisy price information leads to misperceptions of relative price changes and ineﬃcient
supply.
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and Nautz and Scharﬀ (2005). Yet, there are notable exceptions: Following
Lastrapes (2006), the established relationship between U.S. inﬂation and
RPV broke down in the mid-eighties while Reinsdorf (1994) found that the
relation is even negative during the disinﬂationary early 1980s. In the same
vein, Fielding and Mizen (2000), and Silver and Ioannidis (2001) show that
RPV decreases in inﬂation for several European countries.
A common feature of empirical contributions on the inﬂation-RPV link-
age is that they restrict the attention to linear relationships. However, the
mixed evidence provided by the empirical literature suggests that the re-
lationship between inﬂation and RPV is more complex. In particular, the
marginal impact of inﬂation on RPV may diﬀer for high and low inﬂation
regimes. For example, Jaramillo (1999) ﬁnds that U.S. inﬂation’s impact
on RPV is stronger when it is below zero. Further evidence in favor of
threshold eﬀects of inﬂation on RPV is provided by Caglayan and Filiztekin
(2003) for Turkey and Caraballo, Dab´ us and Usabiaga (2006) for Spain and
Argentina. In all these contributions, however, both the number and the
location of inﬂation thresholds are not estimated but imposed exogenously.
This paper sheds more light on the empirical relevance of inﬂation thresh-
olds for RPV by employing a modiﬁed version of the panel threshold model
introduced by Hansen (1999) to recent price data from U.S. cities. This
enables us to estimate the number of inﬂation thresholds, the threshold
levels, as well as the marginal impact of inﬂation on RPV in the various
regimes. Although our sample focuses on the recent low inﬂation period,
the panel data provides us with a suﬃcient variation of inﬂation rates in
a range which should be of particular interest for assessing the current low
inﬂation environment.
Threshold models nest the linear case, such that they can be viewed
as a ﬁrst, natural step to generalize the standard inﬂation-RPV equations.
Of course, one may think of alternative non-linear speciﬁcations, see e.g.
Fielding and Mizen (2008) who investigate the inﬂation-RPV linkage with
non-parametric methods. Our particular interest in the empirical relevance
of inﬂation thresholds is stirred by the recent discussion about the acceptable
range of inﬂation. Although the Federal Reserve has never oﬃcially stated
a target range of inﬂation, most analysts believe that the Fed has implicit
upper and lower limits of its inﬂation objective, compare e.g. Thornton
(2006). Threshold eﬀects of inﬂation are not required for explaining theInﬂation and Relative Price Variability 18
increasing role of inﬂation targets.2 However, in view of the important role
of the inﬂation-RPV linkage for the inﬂation transmission mechanism, the
identiﬁcation of inﬂation thresholds could provide useful information about
the appropriate location and width of an inﬂation targeting band.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces
the data and presents results from a linear panel regression. Section 3 applies
the threshold model to the inﬂation-RPV linkage revealing regime dependent
eﬀects of inﬂation. Section 4 summarizes our main results and oﬀers some
conclusions.
2.2 Inﬂation and RPV in U.S. Cities
2.2.1 The Data Set
Our empirical analysis uses price data of the eight major CPI subcategories
published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) for a panel of 14 U.S.
cities. Due to data availability the sample starts in January 1998 and ends
in August 2005.3
The frequency and the timing of the CPI publication diﬀers across cities:
for eleven cities data is released every second month. Only for three cities
(Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York), price data is available on a monthly
basis. Since the estimation of Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold model re-
quires a balanced panel, we took only the data of every second month
for these three cities. Speciﬁcally, we selected the observations of the odd
months because this choice implied that the number of observations in our
sample from odd and even months is exactly the same.4 After these data
2Inﬂation targets may help anchoring inﬂation expectations and increase the trans-
parency and accountability of the central bank. Mishkin and Westelius (2006) show that
the announcement of an inﬂation targeting band can be interpreted as an inﬂation con-
tract ameliorating the inﬂation bias of discretionary policy. Explicit inﬂation targeting
bands or critical values of inﬂation are used by many central banks, including the Bank
of England and the European Central Bank, to facilitate the communication of monetary
policy.
3We use the CPI-U index representing the expenditures by all urban consumers which
can be downloaded from http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm. The eight subcategories are
food and beverages, housing, apparel, transportation, medical care, recreation, education
and communication, and other goods and services. We selected January 1998 as starting
point because before data for Atlanta, Seattle and Washington data were only published
twice a year and in addition two new major groups were introduced in the CPI-U.
4Note that the lack of synchronicity in the data is not a problem because both, the
traditional linear equation and the threshold model will contain no lagged variables. DataInﬂation and Relative Price Variability 19
adjustments we are left with 40 × 14 = 560 observations of yearly inﬂation
rates, a suﬃcient sample size for applying panel threshold models.
U.S. inﬂation has been low and stable over the last years. Since 1999 the
average inﬂation rate across U.S. cities has ﬂuctuated around 2.7%. Figure
2.1 further displays the minimum and the maximum of the city-speciﬁc
inﬂation rates indicating that inﬂation in U.S. cities exceeded 6% and went
even below zero at least for some cities in some periods. This illustrates
that inﬂation diﬀerentials between U.S. cities have been modest but far from
negligible. Typically, inﬂation rates varied in a range of 3 to 4 percentage
points.5 Figure 2.2 reveals more information about the distribution of city
inﬂation rates from a time-less perspective. Note that our sample provides
us with a suﬃcient variation of inﬂation rates. In particular, 25% of the
observed inﬂation rates were below 1.88% or above 3.50%, respectively.
Figure 2.1: Inﬂation Rates Across U.S. Cities
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Notes: Minimum, mean and maximum of yearly CPI-U inﬂation
rates of 14 U.S. cities from 1999.01 to 2005.08. Source: BLS.
for Atlanta, Detroit, Houston, Miami, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Seattle is released
only in even months; for Boston, Cleveland, Dallas and Washington only in odd months.
5The persistence of inﬂation diﬀerentials between U.S. cities has been relatively low.
Therefore, inﬂation diﬀerentials between cities did not lead to signiﬁcant price level diver-
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of City Inﬂation Rates in the U.S.
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Notes: Yearly CPI-U inﬂation rates of 14 U.S. cities from 1999.01
to 2005.08. Source: BLS.
2.2.2 Relative Price Variability
Following the empirical literature, we deﬁne relative price variability
(RPVit) for city i = 1,...,14 in period t = 1,...,40 as
RPVit =
   
   
8  
j=1
wj(πijt − πit)2 (2.1)
where πijt = lnPijt − lnPijt−6 is the yearly inﬂation rate for subcategory
j = 1,...,8 and Pijt is the level of the corresponding price index. πit =
 8
j=1 wjπijt denotes the inﬂation rate for city i and wj refers to the weight of
the j-th subcategory in the aggregate index such that
 8
j=1wj = 1.6 Silver
and Ioannidis (2001) introduce the coeﬃcient of variation as an alternative
measure of relative price variability. However, this RPV measure is not
applicable in our sample because it includes inﬂation rates below zero.
6In the following, the RPV measure will take into account that subcategory weights
are adjusted on a yearly basis. The subcategory weights can also be downloaded from
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/home.htm. They are only available as averages over all cities
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2.2.3 The Linear Relation Between Inﬂation and RPV
Following the empirical literature on inﬂation and RPV, we begin our anal-
ysis with a linear panel regression of RPV on aggregate inﬂation with city-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects αi:
RPVit = αi + βπit + εit. (2.2)
In line with Lastrapes (2006), the coeﬃcient of inﬂation in the linear RPV
equation (2.2) is clearly insigniﬁcant for recent U.S. data.7 In a widely
used alternative speciﬁcation, RPV is regressed on |πit|, the absolute value
of inﬂation, see e.g. Parks (1978) and Jaramillo (1999). In a low inﬂation
environment, where some inﬂation rates are actually below zero (compare
Figures 1 and 2), this could make a diﬀerence.
Table 2.1: The Linear Relation Between Inﬂation and RPV
ˆ β R2
RPVit = αi + βπit + εit (2.2) −0.025
(0.03)
0.00
RPVit = αi + β|πit| + εit (2a) −0.016
(0.02)
0.00
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Inﬂation and rela-
tive price variability (RPV) for 14 U.S. cities; Sample period 1999.1 -
2005.08; data source: BLS.
For our data, however, the results presented in Table 2.1 (equation 2a)
reveal that this plausible non-linearity in inﬂation’s impact on RPV is not
supported by the data.
7As a consequence, Lastrapes (2006) suggests to include all individual prices in a linear
VAR to estimate the cross-sectional distribution of impulse responses of these prices to
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2.3 Inﬂation Thresholds and the Inﬂation-RPV
Linkage
2.3.1 The Threshold Model
In this section, we investigate whether the linear model (2) is misspeciﬁed
because the marginal impact of inﬂation on RPV depends on the inﬂation
level. In contrast to recent work by e.g. Caglayan and Filiztekin (2003) for
Turkish provinces, and Caraballo, Dab´ us and Usabiaga (2006) for Spain and
Argentina, we do not impose the number and the locations of the diﬀerent
inﬂation regimes a priori. Rather, we employ a modiﬁed version of Hansen’s
(1999) panel threshold model that enables us to test for the number of
thresholds and to estimate the threshold values, i.e. the critical inﬂation
levels where the impact of inﬂation on RPV changes.
Speciﬁcally, we consider the following threshold model for the inﬂation-
RPV linkage:
RPVit = αi +
K−1  
k=0
(δk+1+βk+1πit)I(γk < πit ≤ γk+1)
+βK+1πitI(γK < πit ≤ γK+1) + εit,
(2.3)
where γ0 = −∞, γK+1 = ∞ and I is the indicator function. Equation
(2.3) allows for K inﬂation thresholds and, thus, K + 1 regimes. In each
regime, the marginal impact of inﬂation (βk) on RPV may diﬀer. Given
the observed inﬂation diﬀerentials across cities, it is an additional feature of
the panel threshold model that diﬀerent cities are allowed to be in diﬀerent
inﬂation regimes.
It is worth noting that the panel threshold model (2.3) generalizes the
original setup in Hansen (1999) by allowing for regime dependent intercepts
(δk). According to Bick (2009), ignoring intercepts can lead to biased esti-
mates of both, the thresholds and the corresponding marginal impacts.
2.3.2 The Number of Inﬂation Thresholds
In a ﬁrst step, we applied Hansen’s (1999) sequential testing procedure for
determining the number of inﬂation thresholds. Following Hansen (1999),
we require that each regime contains a minimum number of observations.Inﬂation and Relative Price Variability 23
Column 2 of Table 2.2 shows the results obtained for the 5% rule predomi-
nantly applied in empirical applications of the threshold model. For our data
set, the 5% rule implies that inﬂation thresholds may range from 0.81% to
4.44%. The results indicate a clear rejection of a linear relation (K = 0)
between RPV and inﬂation in favor of a double threshold model. Specif-
ically, the null hypothesis of a single inﬂation threshold (K = 1) in the
inﬂation-RPV equation can be rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level, while
the hypothesis of a double threshold (K = 2) cannot be rejected at the 10%
signiﬁcance level.
Table 2.2: Test Procedure Establishing the Number of Thresholds
RPVit = αi +
 K−1
k=0 (δk+1 + βk+1πit)I(γk < πit ≤ γk+1)
+βK+1πitI(γK < πit ≤ γK+1) + εit
5 % Rule 10 % Rule
No threshold (H0: K=0)
F1 37.75 36.48
p-value 0.00 0.00
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (11.48, 13.13, 16.17) (11.16, 12.78, 16.30)
One threshold (H0: K=1)
F2 18.61 18.31
p-value 0.00 0.01
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (11.24, 12.53, 16.46) (10.61, 12.48, 16.72)
Two thresholds (H0: K=2)
F3 10.64 11.68
p-value 0.15 0.07
(10%, 5%, 1% critical values) (11.48, 12.99, 15.94) (10.82, 12.16, 14.78)
Notes: γ0 = −∞, γK+1 = ∞. The sequential test procedure indicates that the number of
thresholds is K = 2. 1000 bootstrap replications were used to obtain the p-values. Follow-
ing Hansen (1999), each regime is required to contain at least 5% or 10% of all observations,
respectively.
This conclusion appears very robust with respect to diﬀerent assump-
tions concerning the minimum number of observations in each regime. In
particular, we found that the 5% constraint is not binding, implying that
adopting the less restrictive 1% rule (where feasible inﬂation thresholds
range from 0.00% to 5.24%) leads to identical results. This already indi-
cates that the evidence in favor of a regime-dependent inﬂuence of inﬂation
on RPV is not driven by a few outliers. We also performed the test adopting
the unusually restrictive 10% rule. In this case, the range of feasible inﬂation
thresholds shrinks to [1.22%,4.12%] which leads to slightly diﬀerent valuesInﬂation and Relative Price Variability 24
of the test statistics, see Column 3 of Table 2.2. Yet, the main result of the
test remains unaﬀected. In particular, regardless of the minimum number
of observations contained in each regime, Table 2.2 strongly suggests that
the inﬂation-RPV linkage is characterized by two inﬂation thresholds and,
thus, three diﬀerent inﬂation regimes.
2.3.3 A Double Threshold Model for the Relation Between
Inﬂation and RPV
In view of the evidence in favor of two inﬂation thresholds, we estimated the
following double threshold model:
RPVit = αi + (δ1 + β1πit)I(πit ≤ γ1)
+ (δ2 + β2πit)I(γ1 < πit ≤ γ2) + β3πitI(γ2 < πit) + εit
(2.4)
Table 2.3 reports both the estimates obtained under the 5% and the 10%
rule. Results for the 1% rule are not presented since they are identical to
those received for the 5% rule.
The upper part of the table shows the results for the two inﬂation thresh-
olds. The results for the lower inﬂation threshold are virtually unaﬀected
by the applied rule. Both, the point estimate for the threshold (1.672%)
and the corresponding 95% conﬁdence intervals are very similar. Note that
the conﬁdence interval does not contain 2.00%, probably the most popular
number for inﬂation targets. The second inﬂation threshold estimated for
the 5% rule (4.274%) exceeds the upper limit for feasible thresholds under
the 10% rule (4.12%). As a consequence, the point estimate for the second
threshold decreases under the 10% rule. Yet, the main conclusions about
the threshold’s location are very robust: according to the 95% conﬁdence
intervals the upper threshold is clearly above 2.8% and certainly below 4.4%.
Note that observations of all three regimes do not belong exclusively to a
small subset of cities, see Table 2.4. Therefore, the established non-linearity
of the inﬂation-RPV linkage does indeed result from a regime-dependent
marginal impact of inﬂation and cannot be captured by city-speciﬁc inﬂa-
tion coeﬃcients.
The estimates (ˆ β1, ˆ β2, ˆ β3) for the marginal impact of inﬂation in the
three inﬂation regimes are shown in the lower part of Table 2.3. In con-
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Table 2.3: A Double Threshold Model for the Inﬂation-RPV Linkage
RPVit = αi + (δ1 + β1πit)I(πit ≤ γ1)
+(δ2 + β2πit)I(γ1 < πit ≤ γ2) + β3πitI(γ2 < πit) + εit
5 % Rule 10 % Rule
Threshold estimates
  γ1 1.672 1.672
95% conﬁdence interval [1.586, 1.803] [1.586, 1.820]
  γ2 4.274 3.648
95% conﬁdence interval [2.852, 4.385] [2.824, 4.102]
Regime dependent inﬂation coeﬃcients:
  β1 −0.595∗∗ −0.593∗∗
(0.13) (0.13)
  β2 −0.198∗∗ −0.189∗∗
(0.05) (0.07)
  β3 0.548∗ 0.712∗∗
(0.23) (0.14)
Regime dependent intercepts:
  δ1 0.028∗∗ 0.036∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
  δ2 0.026∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.02) (0.01)
R2 0.095 0.091
Observations in regime 1 105 105
Observations in regime 2 415 344
Observations in regime 3 40 111
Notes: ∗∗,∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% level, standard errors in parentheses.
Each regime consists of at least 5% and 10% of all observations, respectively.
reveals that inﬂation has a signiﬁcant impact on RPV. However, both mag-
nitude and sign of the inﬂation coeﬃcient depend on the level of inﬂation.
In the low inﬂation regime, i.e. when inﬂation is below 1.672%, the marginal
impact of inﬂation on RPV is signiﬁcantly negative (−0.59). Thus, a further
decline of inﬂation would increase RPV signiﬁcantly. According to e.g. Ak-
erlof, Dickens and Perry (1996) or Jaramillo (1999), this eﬀect of inﬂation
rates close to zero may point to the presence of nominal downward wage and
price rigidities. In fact, in the intermediate inﬂation regime, when inﬂation
is low but well above zero, the impact of inﬂation on RPV is signiﬁcantly
weaker. In the high inﬂation regime, the marginal impact of inﬂation is posi-
tive under both the 5% (  β3 = 0.548) and the 10% (  β3 = 0.712) speciﬁcation.
When inﬂation exceeds an upper threshold, it seems that RPV-increasingInﬂation and Relative Price Variability 26
Table 2.4: U.S. Cities and Inﬂation Regimes
Low Regime Medium Regime High Regime
Atlanta 14 (14) 25 (20) 1 (6)
Boston 2 (2) 28 (21) 10 (17)
Chicago 11 (11) 28 (27) 1 (2)
Cleveland 14 (14) 26 (23) 0 (3)
Dallas 9 (9) 27 (23) 4 (8)
Detroit 7 (7) 32 (29) 1 (4)
Houston 10 (10) 27 (19) 3 (11)
Los Angeles 0 (0) 39 (28) 1 (12)
Miami 8 (8) 30 (25) 2 (7)
New York 1 (1) 38 (34) 1 (5)
Philadelphia 5 (5) 30 (26) 5 (9)
San Francisco 14 (14) 16 (9) 10 (17)
Seattle 9 (9) 30 (25) 1 (6)
Washington 1 (1) 39 (35) 0 (4)
Total 105 (105) 415 (344) 40 (111)
Notes: The Table shows how often a city appears in the various inﬂation
regimes estimated for the inﬂation-RPV linkage under the 5% rule, com-
pare Table 2.3. The respective numbers under the 10% rule are given in
parantheses.
aspects of inﬂation (including e.g. menu costs and imperfect information
about the price level) become eventually dominant while RPV-decreasing
aspects of inﬂation have faded out.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
The impact of inﬂation on relative price variability (RPV) is a major channel
for real eﬀects of inﬂation. This paper focused on the recent low-inﬂation
period using price data from a panel of U.S. cities from 1999 through 2005.
For this sample, we found that the common linear inﬂation-RPV equation
has to be rejected in favor of a double threshold model with surprisingly
small 95% conﬁdence intervals for both inﬂation thresholds. Partly recon-
ciling the mixed evidence provided by the empirical literature, the estimated
inﬂation coeﬃcients reveal that there are both, positive and negative eﬀects
of inﬂation on RPV. Inﬂation increases RPV only if it exceeds a critical
value which is estimated to range from about 2.8% to 4.4%. By contrast
inﬂation decreases RPV for inﬂation rates close to zero, or more preciselyInﬂation and Relative Price Variability 27
below 1.67%. The weakest impact of inﬂation on RPV is found for the
intermediate regime, when inﬂation is still low but well above zero.
Even central banks with a strong commitment to price stability are not
really interested in zero inﬂation rates.8 Typically, central banks prefer
a more sophisticated notion of price stability. According to e.g. Blinder,
Canetti, Lebow and Rudd (1998, p.98), ”one prominent deﬁnition of ’price
stability’ is inﬂation so low that it ceases to be a factor in inﬂuencing peo-
ple’s decisions.” Therefore, given the crucial importance of relative prices
for economic decisions, an acceptable band of inﬂation rates should ensure
the smallest impact of inﬂation on the variability of relative prices.
The recent literature on the importance of price rigidities revealed that
there are notable diﬀerences in the frequency of price adjustments and im-
plied durations between sectors. Golosov and Lucas (2007), and Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2007) demonstrated that idiosyncratic shocks are an important
factor for the price setting of ﬁrms. In accordance with Woodford (2003),
the eﬃcient level of RPV in an economy with multiple sectors is typically not
zero, since it reﬂects relative price changes driven by fundamentals. There-
fore, the optimal rate of inﬂation need not drive the level of RPV to zero. It
is the marginal eﬀect of inﬂation on RPV that has to be minimized. From
this perspective, our empirical results may shed light on the location and
width of an appropriate inﬂation targeting band. In particular, the inﬂa-
tion thresholds in the inﬂation-RPV nexus suggest that U.S. inﬂation should
range between 1.8% and 2.8%.
The repercussions of the introduction of an explicit targeting band on
inﬂation’s impact on relative prices are not obvious. The analysis of highly
disaggregated price data indicates that the relation between inﬂation and
the price setting of ﬁrms has been underresearched, see e.g. Golosov and
Lucas (2007). In particular, the Calvo and Taylor sticky-price models pre-
dominantly used in current New-Keynesian DSGE models generate only
poor predictions for the persistence and volatility of inﬂation, see Bils and
Klenow (2004). Recent evidence on the price setting of ﬁrms seem to support
the relevance of inﬂation thresholds. According to Nakamura and Steins-
son (2007), aggregate inﬂation plays no role for the frequency and the size
8Several arguments point to the diﬃculties implied by inﬂation rates too close to zero.
For example, positive inﬂation rates may ameliorate problems caused by the zero-bound
for nominal interest rates, see e.g. Adam and Billi (2006).Inﬂation and Relative Price Variability 28
of price changes during the low-inﬂation period 1998-2005. However, from
1988 to 1997, when average inﬂation exceeded 2.8%, the impact of aggregate
inﬂation is signiﬁcant and plausibly signed.
Generalizing the traditional linear inﬂation-RPV regressions, the cur-
rent paper employed Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold model to allow for a
more complex relation between inﬂation and RPV. In the current model,
the marginal impact of inﬂation jumps to a new value whenever inﬂation
exceeds a threshold. Of course, allowing for a more gradual change of the
inﬂation coeﬃcient might lead to a more realistic view on the inﬂation-RPV
linkage. Therefore, following Strickholm and Ter¨ asvirta (2006), incorporat-
ing elements of smooth transition into a threshold model could be a natural
extension and is left for future research.Chapter 3
Fertility, Female Labor
Supply and Child Care
3.1 Introduction
At the Barcelona summit in 2002 the European Union member states agreed
on increasing the supply of subsidized child care slots such that for at least
90% of all children from age three until school entry age and for one third
of the children younger than three subsidized child care is provided. The
aim of this policy is to encourage labor force participation of mothers of
young children and to foster fertility. Since then, child care policies have
gained increased attention by the public and politicians in Germany which
is a particular interesting case. While in Germany the provision rate of
subsidized child care for children from age three onwards is far above 90%, in
the former Western territorial only for three out of hundred children younger
than three subsidized child care is available – which is among the lowest
provision rates in Europe but still representative for a lot of continental
and southern European countries – whereas for more than one third in the
former Eastern territorial.1 In line with the 2002 Barcelona announcements,
the federal government of Germany has passed a law that by 2013 this West-
East gap has to be closed. Since an increase in subsidized child care implies
higher public expenditures, it is of an inherent interest whether the intended
goals of higher maternal labor force participation and fertility rates can be
1When talking about West and East Germany, or the West and the East, I always
refer to the territory that comprised the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German
Democratic Republic (GDR) prior to reuniﬁcation.
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indeed achieved by this policy.
I approach this question by setting up a dynamic and structural life cycle
model with endogenous fertility, female labor supply, subsidized and non-
subsidized child care enrollment choices which will be estimated with data
from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for West Germany. Due
to the diﬀerences in the provision rates between West and East Germany
but the otherwise mostly identical institutional setup, Germany can serve
as an ideal object for studying this question.
Before estimating the model, I document West-East diﬀerences in the
provision of subsidized child care, enrollment in child care and maternal la-
bor force participation. While the estimated model provides a solid ﬁt for
West Germany, policy experiments show that the diﬀerences in the provi-
sion rates of subsidized child care between the West and East – even after
controlling for the diﬀerences in the income level and child care prices –
are not suﬃcient to explain the diﬀerences in maternal labor force partic-
ipation and child care enrollment. On the one hand, this might be partly
attributable to shortcomings of the current version of the model. On the
other hand, the results seem to be plausible since they are not at odds with
those from other studies. The usefulness of the model for conducting further
policy experiments of interest is illustrated by evaluating the 2007 reform of
the maternal leave beneﬁt. Overall, despite some shortcomings the model
seems to be promising for providing quantitative answers to urgent policy
questions concerning fertility and female labor supply.
This paper contributes to the speciﬁc literature on female labor sup-
ply decisions and the general literature on structural modeling of married
females’s behavior, see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), by explicitly allow-
ing for child care choices. It is most strongly related to Wrohlich (2006),
Francesconi (2002) and Greenwood et al. (2003). Wrohlich (2006) estimates
a structural model on female labor supply and child care enrollment for Ger-
many using data from the GSOEP, but not within a life-cycle context and
without a fertility choice. In contrast, Francesconi (2002) studies life-cycle
fertility with endogenous wages through the accumulation of experience.
Child care as a substitute for maternal time is however not modeled within
his framework. He focuses on females living in a stable relationship and hav-
ing the same partner throughout the observation period, which is inline with
many economic theories of household production, female labor supply andFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 31
fertility. This feature as well as the set of choice variables and their discrete
nature from these two papers belonging to the empirical microeconomics lit-
erature is included in my approach. Other elements are closer to the macro
literature. In particular, I abstract from any preference heterogeneity and
preferences shocks, and impose strong structural form assumptions guided
by the setup in Greenwood et al. (2003). Compared to their paper, the
structure of the life cycle is richer in my model, though still much more styl-
ized than in Francesconi (2002), but I neither use an equilibrium concept
nor model marriage and divorce.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 3.2, I describe the
data set, and how the sample is selected and constructed. Section 3.3 doc-
uments facts about the provision and prices of subsidized child care, female
labor force participation and child care enrollment choices in West and East
Germany. I introduce the model in Section 3.4 and the set of externally
determined parameters in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses the estimation
strategy and results. In Sections 3.7 and 3.8 I conduct the policy exper-
iments and lay out the dimensions along which the model setup could be
improved. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Data
In this Section I introduce the data set and brieﬂy discuss the selection and
construction of the sample for my analysis of female labor force participation,
child care and fertility. Details can be found in the appendix.
3.2.1 German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
The GSOEP is an annual household panel, comparable in scope to the Amer-
ican PSID. It is a representative longitudinal study of private households
with the ﬁrst survey having been conducted in 1984 for West Germany and
in 1990 for East Germany. New samples were added in 1994, 1998, 2000,
2002 and 2006.2 The variables I construct from the GSOEP include female
cohabitation, participation and birth histories, child care enrollment choices
and income proﬁles. The data I use are drawn from the 1984 to 2007 waves
2Detailed information about the GSOEP are provided on the corresponding webpage
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and span the years 1983 to 2006 since the variables on labor force partici-
pation and income refer to the year prior to the interview.
3.2.2 Sample Selection
As in Francesconi (2002), only females living in a continuous relationship
with the same partner are included in the sample since many economic
theories of household production, female labor supply, and fertility are meant
to describe behavior of this group only.3 This might introduce a selection
bias, if the unobservables aﬀecting marriage stability are also correlated with
the fertility and participation decisions.4 In this paper, I will use marriage
interchangeably with cohabitation because the interest is less on the legal
status but rather on living in a relationship in one household. Females with
multiple relationships contribute only with their most recent one which has
to be still intact at the last interview.5 Among mothers, only those are
included in the sample that have all children within the current marital
spell, while for childless females the requirement is that they were already
in that spell prior to age forty and thus had (at least theoretically) the
possibility to give birth to a child.
Since the objective of the paper is to compare West and East Germany,
the sample is split up accordingly. Females are assigned to West or East
Germany by their location in 1989 or, if this information is not available, by
the sample region at their ﬁrst interview. Females who moved between the
two parts of the country during the observation period are dropped to ensure
that all females in the sample faced the same environment in terms of child
care provision throughout the whole sample period. Finally, the analysis is
restricted to females born between 1955 and 1975. The time span of female
birth years was chosen that large to have a suﬃcient ﬁnal sample size.6
3For a survey on fertility theories for married females see e.g. Jones et al. (2008). Recent
contributions also model fertility, marriage and divorce jointly, e.g. Regalia and Rios-Rull
(2001) or Greenwood et al. (2003).
4The direction of the sample selection bias with respect to labor force participation
and fertility can go in either direction. For a detailed discussion, see Francesconi (2002)
pp 347f.
5Of course, this does not preclude that relationships might break up after the last
interview.
6The exact selection criteria and the fraction of females aﬀected by each criterion are
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3.2.3 Sample Construction
Female labor force participation proﬁles along children’s age constitute the
core of my analysis. Similarly to Apps and Rees (2005), my focus centers
less on the labor force participation status in each month of a child’s life but
rather on the stages during a child’s adolescence, see Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: A Child’s Life from Birth to Adulthood
Pre-school School
Age
Period
0 3 6.5 9.5 12.5 15.5 18.5
1 2 3 4 5 6
The ﬁrst two periods comprise the pre-schooling years with age six and a
half as the mean age at school entry. The third period refers to grades one to
three in elementary school (Grundschule), while the fourth period comprises
fourth grade of elementary school plus grades ﬁve and six of secondary school
(F¨ orderstufe or Unterstufe). After the ﬁfth period, teenagers can already
graduate (Hauptschulabschluss) and start an apprenticeship or continue to
attend school until they reach adulthood at the end of period six. All periods
have a length of three years with the exception of period two which has a
mean of three years.7
For each period the female labor supply and child care enrollment status
is constructed similar to Francesconi (2002): I assign 0 to each month in
which the female does not work, one half to each month in which she works
part-time and one to each month in which she works full-time.8 Next, the
mean over all months in a period is taken from which the period labor
supply status is deﬁned. Values below 0.25 correspond to not working,
values between 0.25 and 0.75 to part-time working, and values above 0.75
to full-time working. This assignment implies that a female working part-
time in each month of the period and one not working in the ﬁrst half
of a period but full-time in the second half have the same period labor
supply status, namely part-time working. As already mentioned before, this
7Some more details on the ﬁrst two periods are given in Appendix A.2.1.
8The monthly labor force participation status is based on the retrospective information
for the previous year at each interview months. Further details are provided in Appendix
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reﬂects how much a female has worked throughout certain stages during her
children’s adolescence. The same procedure is applied to deﬁne the child
care enrollment status.9 The period income is deﬁned as the sum of all labor
income, including side jobs and self-employment, pensions, unemployment
beneﬁts, compensation for further training or education, and any additional
payments as 13th and 14th salary, vacation and Christmas pay or any further
boni received during the period.
Having deﬁned the periods and variables, one further issue has to be
addressed. If a female has more than one child, the life periods of siblings
only overlap perfectly for twins or triplets. Females observed the last time
prior to the end of their fertile period might get another child. Therefore,
the analysis of females with one child (two/three children) will be based on
the decisions of females after their ﬁrst (second/third) birth until they are
not observed anymore or get a second (third/fourth) child. Hence, a female
who gives birth to two children during the observation period contributes to
facts about females with one child until the second child is born and to facts
about females with two children afterwards. Moreover, only periods that
are observed over their full length, i.e. neither interrupted by another birth
nor left or right censored through the ﬁrst or last interview, are included to
avoid biased averages if there are trends in labor participation or child care
enrollment within a period.
Recall that childless females are only included in the sample if they are
observed to reach at least age forty. I therefore assign the ﬁrst three years
of childless females after turning forty to the ﬁrst period, the next three and
half years to the second period and so forth.
3.2.4 Sample Size
Table 3.1 shows the number of observations for each period for West and
East Germany grouped by the number of children, e.g. for West Germany
389 females with one child that is younger than three and 181 females with
one child of age three to six and half are observed. Since there are not
suﬃcient females with zero or four and more children, the analysis on labor
force participation and child care enrollment will focus on females with one
9Information on child care enrollment is only available for the interview date. In
Appendix A.2.3 I describe how I impute the child care enrollment status for the remaining
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Table 3.1: Distribution of Observations per Region and Number of Children
by Age
West East
Ages 0 1 2 3 4+ 0 1 2 3 4+
< 3 67 389 450 125 39 8 92 100 23 2
< 6.5 36 181 326 98 27 4 66 112 22 2
< 9.5 14 128 270 84 30 3 62 136 28 1
< 12.5 0 108 208 58 15 0 69 150 25 1
< 15.5 0 85 126 38 7 0 67 145 20 0
< 18.5 0 63 105 22 7 0 69 110 16 0
Note: For childless females< 3 corresponds to female ages 40 to 42, < 6.5
to 43 and 46.5 and so forth. Since the ﬁrst birth cohort of females included
in the sample was born in 1945 and the last observations are from 2006,
childless females could only be observed for three periods.
to three children.
The sample used to calculate the fertility rate and distribution comprises
all selected females who are at least of age 40 at their last interview, even
if they only have incomplete periods and thus do not contribute to the set
of stylized facts about labor supply and child care enrollment. Since the
timing of birth will not be part of my investigation, females who have not
yet completed their fertile period, assumed to end at the age of forty, are
not included. Similarly, fertility outcomes of East German females are not
investigated because the majority of them has made a part of their fertility
decisions prior to reuniﬁcation and thus in a completely diﬀerent economic
and institutional setup. Eventually, there are 1112 West German females
left over for the fertility analysis.
3.3 Stylized Facts
I ﬁrst present facts on the child care market in West and East Germany
which serve as exogenous inputs in my model. Afterwards, I present facts
on female labor force participation and child care enrollment for West and
East Germany from which a subset will be used as moments the model has
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3.3.1 Child Care Market
The market for child care in Germany is divided into a subsidized and non-
subsidized sector with the former mainly made up by daycare centers and the
latter by nannies which either provide care at their or the families’ homes.
Table 3.2: Child Care Fees
Subsidized Non-
West East Subsidized
Baseline price
Part-time, Ages 3 to 6.5 2946.77 2737.42 8525.53
Markups
Full-time (+) 1718.63 789.06 6000.42
Ages 0 to 2 (+) 984.52 613.55 —
Per Sibling in Care (–) 1431.01 701.14 —
Child Care Fees Table 3.2 shows the parental fees for subsidized and
non-subsidized child care.10 The per child, parental fee for a subsidized part-
time slot for children aged three to six and a half in West Germany amounts
to 2946.77e for the whole period. If the slot is full-time, the fee increases
by 1718.63e. Slots for children aged zero to two cost 984.52e more than
for a child of age three to six and a half. Finally, a discount of 1413.01 e
is granted per sibling in care.11 With the exception of the discount, child
care fees are substantially lower in the East than in the West, in particular
for full-time child care. Non-subsidized child care is estimated to be two
to four times as expensive as subsidized child care which seems plausible as
around 75% of the costs per slot are covered by the subsidy, see Kolvenbach
10The details on how the fees were estimated are given in Appendix A.3.1. All prices
are in real 2007 terms and have been computed based on price level changes for uniﬁed
Germany. The price level in East Germany is on average lower than in the West but oﬃcial
statistics do not exist, see Kosfeld et al. (2008). Hence the real diﬀerences in income and
prices between the two parts of the country are overestimated here.
11In addition to the sibling discount, the fees for subsidized child care increase with the
household income. Moreover, between 5% to 10% of the children are fully exempted from
fees. These features have been ignored here but will be incorporated in future work.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 37
et al. (2004). There is neither a signiﬁcant markup for children younger
than three nor a sibling discount or West-East diﬀerence for non-subsidized
child care.
Table 3.3: Provision Rates for Subsidized Child Care
West East
Ages 0 to 2
Part-time 4.3 38.8
Full-time 1.7 41.1
Total 6.0 79.9
Ages 3 to 6.5
Part-time 71.8 2.4
Full-time 23.7 97.6
Total 95.4 100.0
Subsidized Slot Provision Table 3.3 shows the provision rates of sub-
sidized part- and full-time child care slots in both parts of the country broken
further down by age.12 The diﬀerences in the provision rates between West
and East Germany and the two age groups originate from very distinctive
objectives of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (FRG) which have persisted until today. In the
GDR the intention was to enable mothers of young children to work which
is reﬂected in a provision rate of subsidized child care slots for 79.9 out of
100 children aged zero to two with around a half of them being full-time and
that all children aged three to six and a half have access to a subsidized slot
of which 97.6% are full-time. In contrast, the FRG oﬀered subsidized child
care to provide aﬀordable pre-school education for children from age three
onwards. Accordingly, for children aged zero to two hardly any subsidized
child care is provided – only for 4.3 out of hundred a part-time and for 1.7
a full-time slot – whereas for nearly every child above from age three to six
12The deﬁnition of a subsidized part- and full-time child care slot corresponds to the
deﬁnition of part- and full-time child care enrollment as outlined in Section 3.2.3. The
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and a half with around 3/4 being only part-time. Although aggregate statis-
tics on queuing for subsidized child care slots are not available, the supply
of subsidized child care slots in Germany is usually considered to be ﬁxed,
at least in the short to medium run, rather than an equilibrium outcome
equating demand for subsidized child care at the regulated, ﬁxed prices, see
Kreyenfeld et al. (2002). Wrohlich (2008) estimates the excess demand for
both parts of the country to be close to zero for children from age three
onwards but far above zero for the younger age group.13 Put diﬀerently,
some females might face a constrained choice set when deciding on child
care enrollment.
3.3.2 Female Labor Force Participation and Child Care En-
rollment
My analysis focuses on female labor force participation proﬁles. Cohort and
time eﬀects, and the timing and spacing of births are not part of the investi-
gation. I ﬁrst present facts about overall female labor force participation and
child care enrollment. Afterwards, I distinguish between part- and full-time
rates.14
Subsidized and Non-Subsidized Child Care Child care enrollment
in West Germany (6.3%) for children aged zero to two is slightly above the
provision rate (6.0%), which can be attributed to the large usage of non-
subsidized child care, see Table 3.4. 40.4% of the children enrolled are
enrolled in non-subsidized child care, either exclusively or in addition to
subsidized child care.15 In contrast, in the East 60.3% of the children are
enrolled in child care, i.e. 54 percentage points more than in the West, which
is ﬁrst even below the provision rate of 79.9% and second nearly entirely in
subsidized child care.
13The numbers in Wrohlich (2008) are not directly comparable to those discussed here
due to the diﬀerent period length and sample selection.
14The fraction of females with one, two and three children is neither constant over time
nor the same between West and East Germany, see Table 3.1. Therefore, I weight the
labor force participation and child care enrollment rates for both parts of the country by
the fraction of West German females with one, two and three children, conditional on
having children, which are 0.234, 0.565 and 0.201. This has only a small quantitative but
no qualitative impact on the presented facts.
15Due to changes in the survey questionnaire only the overall enrollment rate as well as
the fraction enrolled in subsidized child care can be calculated for the whole time period,
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Table 3.4: Subsidized and Non-Subsidized Child Care
West East
Ages 0 to 2
Provision Rate Subsidized Care 6.0 79.9
Enrollment Rate (Subsidized and Non-Subsidized Care) 6.3 60.3
Fraction Enrolled in Non-Subsidized Care 40.4 1.8
Ages 3 to 6.5
Provision Rate Subsidized Care 95.4 100.0
Enrollment Rate (Subsidized and Non-Subsidized Care) 95.3 93.3
Fraction Enrolled in Non-Subsidized Care 0.8 1.6
Table 3.5: Child Care Enrollment Rate
Conditional on Maternal Labor Force Participation Status
West East
Ages 0 to 2
Not working 2.9 30.7
Working 13.9 87.3
Ages 3 to 6.5
Not working 93.4 68.0
Working 96.7 98.2Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 40
The picture looks entirely diﬀerent for children aged three to six and a
half. Enrollment increases to over 90%, is very similar for the West and the
East, and in the West non-subsidized child care ceases to be important also
in relative terms.
Child Care Enrollment by Maternal Labor Force Participation
Table 3.5 shows the child care enrollment rate conditional on the maternal
labor force participation status. On the one hand, child care is strongly used
by non-working females, with the exception of children aged zero to two in
the West. On the other hand, child care is not a prerequisite for mothers to
work. For example, only 13.9% of the working females with children aged
zero to two in West Germany use child care, while the remaining 86.1%
in this group rely on non-paid child care provided by family members or
friends. Still, working females use more child care than non-working females.
Figure 3.2: Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment Rates
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Labor Supply Figure 3.2 presents female labor force participation pro-
ﬁles by the child’s age. While the shape is similar for the West and the East,
the proﬁle is shifted upwards for East German females. The gap originatesFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 41
when children are of age zero to two (56% vs. 33%), increases further when
children are of age three and six and half and starts to shrink once they
enter school. The participation rate in the East remains around 90% from
age three onwards whereas it increases constantly in the West and reaches
78% when the child is between 15.5 and 18.5.
Part- vs. Full-time As already shown in Table 3.3, a further diﬀer-
ence in the provision of subsidized child care slots between West and East
Germany is the fraction of full-time slots. In the East more than one half of
the subsidized child care slots for children aged zero to two and nearly all for
children aged three to six and a half are full-time, whereas in the West only
around one fourth for both age groups. Similar diﬀerences can be found for
part- and full-time child care enrollment and labor force participation, see
Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Part- and Full-time
Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment Rates
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In West Germany part-time child care enrollment and labor force partic-
ipation dominate, whereas in the East the full-time rates are larger with the
exception for children aged zero to two. Furthermore, the shape of the laborFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 42
force participation proﬁle in the West is mainly driven by the part-time and
in the East by the full-time labor force participation rate, see ﬁgures 3.2 and
3.3.16,17
3.3.3 Summary Key Facts
The facts documented in this Section about labor force participation of
married females with children and their child care enrollment decisions can
be summarized as follows:
West Germany
1) Subsidized child care is two to four times as cheap as non-subsidized
child care, but only provided for very few children aged zero to two
whereas for nearly all children aged three to six and half.
2) Enrollment rates in child care match up with the provision rates while
non-subsidized child care is only important for children aged zero to
two.
3) Child care is used by non-working females but is not a prerequisite for
females to work.
4) The labor force participation rate grows strongly while children are of
pre-school age and less afterwards.
West vs. East Germany
1) Subsidized child care in East Germany is cheaper than in the West
and more subsidized slots per 100 children, particularly full-time, are
provided.
2) Enrollment in the East is higher than in the West and even below the
provision rates leaving hardly any role for non-subsidized child care.
16Similar to child care enrollment conditional on the labor force participation status as
shown in Table 3.5, full-time child care enrollment is larger for children of females full-time
working compared to part-time working females, but again full-time child care enrollment
is not a prerequisite for full-time labor force participation.
17Kreyenfeld (2001) and Wrohlich (2006) document similar patterns for West and East
Germany. Kreyenfeld (2001) shows them for all mothers independent of the relationship
status from the 1997 Mikrozensus, a representative cross-section of the German popula-
tion. Similar to my paper, Wrohlich (2006) focuses on females in relationships and uses
the 2001 to 2003 waves from the GSOEP. Both studies restrict their attention to mothers
with children up to age ten.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 43
3) In the East, the labor force participation rate is always higher than in
the West and already remains stable after children turned three.
4) In East Germany the full-time labor force participation and child care
enrollment rates are larger than the corresponding part-time rates,
whereas the opposite is true for the West.
In the next Section, I develop a model that is aimed to capture the
stylized facts for West Germany. Having an estimated version of it, I ask
to which degree, ceteris paribus, the diﬀerences in the provision rates of
subsidized child care slots and the prices for subsidized child care explain
the diﬀerences in labor force participation proﬁles.
3.4 The Model
I now present a life cycle model for married females featuring endogenous
fertility, labor supply with accumulation of experience and child care en-
rollment decisions. The model borrows some of the elements in Wrohlich
(2008), Francesconi (2002) and Greenwood et al. (2003).
Demographics A female lives for six periods. At the beginning of her
life, she is exogenously matched with a man and chooses how many children
to have. Both the husband and children stay with the female throughout
her whole life. The period length corresponds to three years such that each
period corresponds to certain period in a child’s life, see Figure 3.1.18
Endowments Each female and husband are indexed by productivity
levels ǫ and ǫ∗ representing the stochastic part of each spouses’ market wages.
Asterisks refer to values for the husband. Both spouses are assigned an initial
productivity in period one which evolves over time according to an AR(1)
process:
ǫt = ρǫt−1 + εt with εt ∼ N(0,σ2
ε)
ǫ∗
t = ρ∗ǫt−1 + ε∗
t with ε∗
t ∼ N(0,σ2
ε∗)
(3.1)
18For period two the overlap is not exact since the mean duration in the data is three
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In the ﬁrst two periods, while the children are not yet in school females can
enroll them in subsidized and/or in non-subsidized child care. Both types
of child care are perfect substitutes but subsidized child care is not available
for every female. I assume that access to subsidized child care, denoted as
at, is determined by a lottery from which each mother draws and which will
be described in more detail further below.
Preferences The female is the household’s decision maker and her util-
ity function consists of two parts. The ﬁrst is given by
UI
t = δ0
(ψct)
1−γ0
1 − γ0
+δ1
n1−γ1
1 − γ1
m
1−ξ
t
1 − ξ
+ δ2
(1 − lt − mt)1−γ2
1 − γ2
. (3.2)
A female is endowed with one unit of (non-sleeping) time which she can split
between working lt, spending time mt with her n children or enjoying leisure
1 − lt − mt. The interaction of the number of children with maternal time
introduces a quantity-quality trade-oﬀ. The function ψ translates household
consumption into the consumption realized by a female using the OECD
equivalence scale – also called the Oxford scale – with ψ = (1.7 + 0.5n)−1.
Equation (3.3) states the budget constraint:
ct = yt(lt,xt,ǫt) + y∗
t(t,ǫ∗
t) − pcc(n,t,ccs,t,ccns,t) + ̟(n,t,lt). (3.3)
yt(lt,xt,ǫ) is the female’s net income depending on her current productivity,
accumulated experience which evolves according to
xt = xt−1 + lt−1 (3.4)
and labor supply lt. The husband is assumed to be working full-time and
receives a net income y∗
t(t,ǫ∗
t).19 pcc(n,t,ccs,t,ccns,t) denotes the child care
costs which may vary nonlinearly with the number of children, time pe-
riod, amount and type of demanded child care, i.e. subsidized ccs,t and
non-subsidized ccns,t care. The exact forms for the income process and child
care prices are speciﬁed further below. Finally, ̟(n,t,lt) represents public
transfers related to the female’s labor force participation status, age (equal
to the period) and number of children.
Children of pre-school age cannot be left alone. If the female does not
19Only 2% of the husbands in the sample are at some point not in the labor force.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 45
take care of them, e.g. because she is working, someone else has to do it.
Recall that only 13.9% of the females with the children younger than age zero
to two who work use child care, see Table 3.5. I denote the time children
neither spend with the mother, nor in subsidized or non-subsidized child
care, by
ht = 1 − mt − ccs,t − ccns,t for t ≤ 2. (3.5)
Given that most working females with children aged zero to two used
non-paid child care, the fact that they switch to using paid child care when
their children are of age three to six and a half, see Table 3.5, implies the
existence of some costs of non-paid child care – as long as one does not
assume that non-paid child care ceases to be available once children turn
three. I formalize this by introducing a cost for non-paid child care for
periods one and two:20
Ut =
 
UI
t − ωh2
t ∀ t ≤ 2
UI
t ∀ 3 ≤ t ≤ 6
. (3.6)
The weight ω of the cost function is related to the children’s ages and the
number of children:
ω = φ0φt−1
1 nφ2. (3.7)
φ1 attaches a weight to the cost function. Similar to paid child care, I allow
the costs of non-paid child care to vary with the age (φ1) and the number
of children (φ2).
Choice Variables In line with the stylized facts, all choices are dis-
crete. Labor supply l, subsidized ccs and non-subsidized child care ccns
can take on three values: 0 for non-working/no child care, 1
4 for part- and
1
2 for full-time work/care. If the (non-sleeping) time endowment would be
16 hours, then part-time work/care would correspond to four and full-time
work/care to eight hours. I assume that child care facilities are only open
during the ﬁrst half of the day, i.e. in the morning and early afternoon which
implies that
ccs + ccns ≤
1
2
. (3.8)
20It might be reasonable to consider such costs also for children in elementary school or
even of older ages but I refrain from it since the focus of this paper is on pre-school child
care.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 46
Similarly, I assume that working opportunities also only exist during the
ﬁrst half of a day. A female can also spend time with her children in the
late afternoon and evening such that mt ∈ {0, 1
4, 1
2, 3
4,1} but not while she
is at work or her children are in child care or in school (st):
mt ≤
 
1 − max{lt,ccs,t + ccns,t} ∀ t ≤ 2
1 − max{lt,st} ∀ 3 ≤ t ≤ 6
. (3.9)
Dynamic Problem Figure 3.4 presents the timing of events during
a female’s life which is deﬁned by the stages of her children’s adolescence,
see also Figure 3.1. The term zt combines the productivity states of both
spouses ǫt and ǫ∗
t and the female’s experience level xt, with x1 = 0. The ﬁrst
Figure 3.4: Life Cycle
States
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period is split up in two stages with diﬀerent states and decisions. In the
ﬁrst stage, the initial productivity levels are assigned and the female chooses
the optimal number of children.21 By then she does not know whether she
will have access to subsidized child care in period one. The ﬁrst stage value
function in period one is
  V (ǫ1,ǫ∗
1,x1) = max
n
{Ea1V (1,ǫ1,ǫ∗
1,x1,n,a1), n = 0,1,2,...,N} . (3.10)
Since the children stay with a female throughout her entire life, n becomes a
state variable. In the second stage, a lottery determines whether a female has
access to subsidized child care a1, which can take on three values: 0, 1
4 and
21Fertility is perfectly controllable, for a model and the consequences of uncertain fer-
tility see e.g. Choi (2009).Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 47
1
2 referring to no, a part- or full-time subsidized child care slot. Afterwards,
the female decides on her labor supply l1 and those with n > 0 children, on
how much time to spend with them m1 and on their enrollment in subsidized
child care ccs,1 – possibly restricted by a1 – and non-subsidized child care
ccns,1. The second stage value function in period two is
V (1,ǫ1,ǫ∗
1,x1,n,a1) = max
m,l,ccs≤a1,ccns
U( ) + βEǫ,ǫ∗,a2V (2,ǫ2,ǫ∗
2,x2,n,a2)
subject to (3.3), (3.4), (3.8) and (3.9).
(3.11)
U( ) is given by Equation (3.6) and β is the discount factor. At the beginning
of period two, the new productivity levels ǫ2 and ǫ∗
2 realize according to the
AR(1) process speciﬁed in Equation (3.1) and access to child care a2 is drawn
from a new lottery. The set of choice variables in period two is identical to
the second decision stage in period one. The value unction in period two is
V (2,ǫ2,ǫ∗
2,x2,n,a2) = max
m,l,ccs≤a2,ccns
U( ) + βEǫ,ǫ∗V (3,ǫ3,ǫ∗
3,x3,n,0)
subject to (3.3), (3.4), (3.8) and (3.9).
(3.12)
From period three onwards, children attend school and females cannot use
child care anymore (at = 0 for t ≥ 3). She only decides on how much to
work and how much time to spend with their children, the value function in
period t is
V (t,ǫt,ǫ∗
t,xt,n,0) =max
m,l
U( ) + βEǫ,ǫ∗V (t + 1,ǫt+1,ǫ∗
t+1,xt+1,n,0) ∀ 3 ≤ t ≤ 5
subject to (3.3), (3.4) and (3.9).
(3.13)
In the last period, the value function is given by
V (6,ǫ6,ǫ∗
6,x6,n,0) = max
m,l
U( ) subject to (3.3) and (3.9). (3.14)
Maternal Leave In Germany, every mother who has been working
until the birth of a child has the right to return to her pre-birth employer
at her pre-birth wage within three years after birth.22 To account for this
22Since in the model life starts with the birth decision, there is no pre-birth labor supplyFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 48
regulation, I introduce a further state variable qt:
qt =

 
 
0 for t = 1, t ≥ 3
0 for t = 2, x2 > 0 or n = 0
ǫ1 for t = 2, x2 = 0, n > 0
. (3.15)
The eﬀect of taking the maternity leave in period one, i.e. l1 = 0 and thus
x2 = 0, materializes in period two where the income is based on the max-
imum from {ǫ1,ǫ2}.23,24 The period three productivity level is then deter-
mined by
ǫ3 =
 
ρ max{ǫ1,ǫ2} + ε3 if q2 = ǫ1, l2 > 0
ρǫ2 + ε3 else
.
Income Process A female’s oﬀered wage is given by a classical Mincer
(1974) earnings equation with returns to experience. As a normalization xt
is multiplied by two (˜ xt = 2xt) such that part-time work increases ˜ x by 1
2
and full-time work by one.
ln Yt = η0 + η1˜ xt + η2˜ x2
t + ǫt. (3.16)
Labor income taxes are levied according to the function τ which together
with labor supply result in the following net incomes:
yt(lt,xt,ǫt) =

  
  
0 for l = 0, i.e. non-working
τ
 
eYt
2
 
for l = 1
4, i.e. part-time work
τ
 
eYt 
for l = 1
2, i.e. full-time work
. (3.17)
Since the husbands is assumed to be working full-time, he accumulates only
full-time experience such that his income is given by:
ln Y ∗
t = η∗
0 + η∗
1(t − 1) + η∗
2(t − 1)2 + ǫ∗
t (3.18)
and therefore all females can go on maternal leave. This assumption is supported by the
data for the ﬁrst birth, prior to which 94% of the West and 98% of the East German
females in the sample work.
23Females working part- or full-time in period one “return” by construction at their
pre-birth income ǫ1.
24Studies focusing on maternity leave policies are Erosa et al. (2008) or Bernal and
Fruttero (2008).Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 49
The husband’s net income y∗
t is then determined by applying the tax code
τ to eY ∗
t .25
Child Care Costs The functional form for the child care costs corre-
sponds to the structure of fees as reported in Table 3.2. They accrue per
child if a source of care is used and are associated with a ﬁxed cost (ζj,0),
a mark up for full-time child care (ζj,1) and period one (ζj,2). A per child
discount is granted for every additional sibling enrolled (ζj,3),
pcc(t,n,ccs,t,ccns,t) =
 
i=s,ns
nI(ccj > 0)
 
ζj,0 + ζj,1I
 
ccj,t =
1
2
 
+ ζj,2I(t = 1) − ζj,3(n − 1)
 
.
(3.19)
3.5 Taking the Model to the Data
All non-preference parameters are obtained directly from the data which I
describe now in more detail.
Income Process Since nearly all men in the data are working full-time,
their period incomes can be easily calculated such that it is straightforward
to estimate the deterministic (Equation (3.18)) and stochastic (Equation
(3.1)) part of the male income process. For females it is more diﬃcult to
construct a period income from the retrospective monthly incomes because
of the variation in hours worked for part-time employment.26 I circumvent
this problem by assuming that females face the same wage process as their
husbands but take into account that females are on average younger than
their spouses, 2.9 years in the West and 2.5 years in the East. This age
diﬀerence corresponds approximately to one model period. I therefore shift
the income process for males by one period to obtain the one for females.
The logic behind that is the following. A female that has worked full time
in all periods, i.e. ˜ xt = t − 1, should receive the same (deterministic) wage
25In the model, the age of the female and her husband are the same, which is not true
in the data. This age diﬀerence is captured by allowing for gender speciﬁc coeﬃcients in
the income process and will be discussed in more detail below.
26Conditional on having an appropriate period income, a Heckman (1979)-style selection
model could be estimated to account for the selection into employment.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 50
a male had in the period before because of the age diﬀerence:
ln Yt =η∗
0 + η∗
1(t − 1     
˜ xt
− 1) + η∗
2(t − 1     
˜ xt
− 1)2 + ǫt (3.20)
Equation (3.20) can then be reformulated to obtain the coeﬃcients of the
female income process:
ln Yt =η∗
0 − η∗
1 + η∗
2       
η0
+ [η∗
1 − 2η∗
2]
      
η1
˜ xt + η∗
2     
η2
˜ x2
t + ǫt (3.21)
In the model in which males and females have the same age, at a given
period females have therefore a lower mean wage and face larger returns
to experience than their spouses if η∗
2 < 0. I allow for a discriminatory
gender wage gap in mean income not driven by the age diﬀerence, using the
full-time wages of both sexes at the last interview date prior birth:27
η0 = η∗
0 − η∗
1 + η∗
2 + ∆gender. (3.22)
The last missing piece of the income process concerns the stochastic part
(Equation (3.1)) where I follow Attanasio et al. (2008) and use the male
estimates for the females. For the numerical solution of the model, the AR(1)
process for productivity (Equation (3.1)) is discretized using the method
proposed by Tauchen (1986) into 20 states. The initial productivity levels
are assigned according to the corresponding stationary distribution.
Table 3.6 and Figure 3.5 summarize the estimation results on the income
process.28 The gender wage gap, mean income, returns to experience and
the standard deviation of the stochastic part of income are larger in West
Germany providing additional sources for the diﬀerence in female labor force
participation and child care enrollment between West and East Germany on
top of the distinctive provision and prices of subsidized child care.
27By then 75% of the females are working full-time such that selection into full-time
employment is much less of a problem.
28The diﬀerence between η0 and η
∗
0 without the gender wage gap is -0.085 for the West
and -0.06 for the East. Not controlling for age, increases the pre-birth gender wage gap by
-0.075 for the West and -0.063 for the East. Thus, using the same experience proﬁle for
men and females but shifting it by one period as done in Equation (3.20) and Equation
(3.21) provides an accurate estimate of the pre-birth gender income diﬀerence due to the
age diﬀerence of spouses.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 51
Table 3.6: Income Process
West East
Gender wage gap
∆gender -0.255 -0.120
Deterministic part (3.18)/(3.16)
η∗
0 / η0 11.547 / 11.207 11.011 / 10.831
η∗
1 / η1 0.073 / 0.097 0.053 / 0.067
η∗
2 / η2 -0.012 / -0.012 -0.007 / -0.007
Stochastic part (3.1)
ρ∗, ρ 0.818 0.819
σε∗, σε 0.350 0.315
Note: η0 is calculated as in Equation (3.22) and η1,η2 as in Equation
(3.21).
Figure 3.5: Income Proﬁles (in 1000e)
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Child Care Similar to Wrohlich (2006), the slot provision rates shown
in Table 3.3 are used directly as success probabilities for drawing access to
a part- or full-time slot.29 The parameters of the child care cost function
Equation (3.19) can be directly linked to the estimates from Table 3.2.
Taxes and Transfers Taxes are kept as simple as possible and will be
proportional to income with an estimated tax rate of 0.36.30 The transfers
include child beneﬁts which are paid each period depending on the total
number of children, see Table 3.7. Finally, non- and part-time working
Table 3.7: Child Beneﬁts
Number of Children Total Beneﬁts
1 3178.52 e
2 7172.09 e
3 13108.90 e
4 19775.58 e
mothers receive in period one a maternity beneﬁt of 1583.91e. The trans-
fers and taxes are the same for both parts of the country.
Schooling hours Once children enter school, maternal time is restricted
by the time children spend there as speciﬁed in Equation (3.9). I set
st = 1
2 ∀ t ≥ 3, i.e. children are assumed to attend full-time schooling,
which partially accommodates for the model feature that females are not al-
lowed to use child care after period two. Though elementary schools usually
open only in the morning, i.e. are part-time, subsidized child care within or
outside the school exist. While from the GSOEP actual enrollment in these
oﬀers is available, there are no aggregate statistics on the provision of care
provided in schools in the early afternoon. To keep the focus on pre-school
29This is the a strong assumption since the assignment of slots is of course not fully ran-
dom. Single females usually have privileged access. From that perspective, the provision
rates used here constitute an upper bound on the true access probabilities. Furthermore,
working females and those with already a child enrolled in a subsidized institution have
higher chances of getting a slot. However, the magnitude of this eﬀect cannot be extracted
from the aggregate statistics on slot provision and I therefore ignore this issue.
30Implementing a more realistic tax system featuring progressive and joint taxation is
left for future work.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 53
child care, I do not treat this issue.
3.6 Estimation
In this Section, I ﬁrst discuss the estimation methodology, the data moments
to be matched, and show the ﬁnal parameter estimates. Afterwards I present
the model ﬁt and conduct several comparative statics exercises to gain some
insights about the role of the preference parameters.
3.6.1 Methodology
Three preference parameters are ﬁxed and the remaining eight are estimated
jointly by minimizing the square diﬀerences between data and model mo-
ments. The discount factor is chosen to reﬂect a 4% yearly interest rate as in
Kydland and Prescott (1982), β =
  1
1.04
 3, and the curvature of the utility of
consumption γ0 is set to one, i.e. I assume log utility.31 Since one of the four
weights can be normalized, δ0 is set to one. The estimation is a simpliﬁed
simulated methods of moments procedure with the identity matrix used for
weighting the moments:
1) Pick an initial guess for the parameters to be estimated.
2) Solve the model recursively, obtain optimal policy functions, simulate
life cycles for a large number of females, here 100000, and calculate
model equivalents to data targets.
3) Calculate the objective function, i.e. the sum of the square distance
between data and model moments.
4) If the improvement in the objective function is
(a) below a pre-speciﬁed tolerance, exit.
(b) above a pre-speciﬁed tolerance, update the parameter values, re-
turn to step two and iterate until convergence.32
31Estimation of these kind of models is far from being trivial. The best estimation
results were obtained with γ0 = 1. In future work I will try to estimate γ0 as well.
32The parameters are updated via an asynchronous parallel pattern
search algorithm, see Gray and Kolda (2005), and Kolda (2005). The
corresponding software (APPSPACK) is freely available on the web
(https://software.sandia.gov/appspack/version5.0/index.html) and was runFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 54
3.6.2 Data Moments
The model is estimated for West German data with the following set of data
moments:
• the fraction of females with one, two and three children:33
3 moments
• the fraction of mothers not-, part- and full-time working by number
of children and period:
54 moments = 3 fractions × 3 number of children × 6 periods
• the fraction of children not-, part- and full-time enrolled in child care
by number of children and period:
18 moments = 3 fractions × 3 number of children × 2 periods
In total, there are 75 moments to match and eight model parameters to
be estimated.
3.6.3 Parameter Estimates
Table 3.8 shows the ﬁxed (only consumption) and estimated parameter val-
ues.34 A brief comment on two parameters is worth mentioning. First,
φ1 > 1 implies that the costs of non-paid child care are larger for children
aged three to six and a half relative to children aged zero to two. A possi-
ble interpretation could be some sort of beneﬁts of paid over non-paid child
care that gain more importance as the children age, e.g. being together with
other children. Second, 0 < φ2 < 1 indicates that the costs of non-paid
child care are concave in the number of children, i.e. organizing non-paid
child care for two children is more but not twice as costly as for one child.
in parallel mode on the Deutsche Bank/E-Finance Lab House of Finance Servercluster. I
am indebted to the cluster administrator Alexander Zeiss for installing APPSPACK for
me on the cluster and his help to get started with Linux.
33The maximum number of children is restricted to be three.
34There is no guarantee that the estimated parameters refer to a global minimum of the
objective function. To check for other local minima, a thorough search of the parameter
space was performed and no better ﬁt was found.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 55
Table 3.8: Preference Parameters
Value
Consumption†
δ0 1.00
γ0 1.00
Children
δ1 0.04
γ1 0.94
ξ 0.85
Leisure
δ2 0.43
γ2 0.47
Non-paid child care
φ0 0.17
φ1 2.61
φ2 0.43
†Parameters are not estimated.
3.6.4 Model Fit
To evaluate the model ﬁt, I ﬁrst compare the set of stylized facts presented
in Section 3.3 for West Germany to the corresponding model moments. Af-
terwards, I confront the set of targeted moments from the data with the
model.
Aggregate Moments Table 3.9 presents the enrollment rates in subsi-
dized and non-subsidized child care for West Germany. The model generates
only one third of the observed enrollment rates in child care for children
aged zero to two (6.3 vs. 1.8%) and one half of the fraction enrolled inFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 56
non-subsidize care (40.4 vs. 21.0%). In contrast, the ﬁt for children from
age three onwards is much better and the huge diﬀerence in the enrollment
rates between the two age groups is captured as well.
Table 3.9: Model Fit – Subsidized and Non-Subsidized Child Care
Data Model
Ages 0 to 2
Provision Rate Subsidized Care 6.0 6.0
Enrollment Rate (Subsidized and Non-Subsidized Care) 6.3 1.8
Fraction Enrolled in Non-Subsidized Care 40.4 21.0
Ages 3 to 6.5
Provision Rate Subsidized Care 95.4 95.4
Enrollment Rate (Subsidized and Non-Subsidized Care) 95.3 93.7
Fraction Enrolled in Non-Subsidized Care 0.8 1.8
Table 3.10: Model Fit
Child Care Enrollment Rate Conditional on Maternal Labor Force Status
Data Model
Ages 0 to 2
Not working 2.9 0.0
Working 13.9 4.6
Ages 3 to 6.5
Not working 93.4 86.3
Working 96.7 98.0
Child Care Enrollment rates conditional on the maternal labor force
status are shown in Table 3.10. As in the data, the vast majority of theFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 57
working females with children aged zero to two in the model is not using
any paid child care but relies on non-paid child care. Further, most of the
non-working females with children aged three to six and a half uses paid
child care. The estimate of φ1 being larger than one indicates that the
increase in the child care enrollment rate between the two age groups for
non-working mothers cannot be only generated by the higher provision rate
and lower prices of subsidized child care slots as well as increasing spousal
income.
Figure 3.6: Model Fit
Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment Rates
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Female labor force participation proﬁles are displayed in Figure 3.6.
Though the overall ﬁt looks very well, the part-time labor force partici-
pation rate in the model is less than in the data while the children are of
pre-school age and the increase of full-time labor force participation over
time is not matched, see Figure 3.7.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 58
Figure 3.7: Model Fit – Part- and Full-time
Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment Rates
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Targeted Moments Table 3.11 shows the fractions of females with
n = {0,1,2,3} children in the data and the model, which have been among
the set of target moments, and the implied fertility rate. There are no
Table 3.11: Model Fit – Fertility
Fraction with n children Fertility
0 1 2 3 Rate
Data 13.9 20.2 48.7 17.3 1.69
Model 0 35.7 30.2 34.1 1.98
childless females in the model in contrast to 13.9% in the data. Part of
this mismatch might be attributed to physical constraints preventing some
females to get children, from which I abstracted in the model by assuming
perfectly controllable fertility choices. In total, the fraction of females with
n ≤ 1 children is very close between data (34.1) and model (35.7). TheFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 59
fraction of females with three children in the model is nearly twice as large
as in the data.35 This adds up to a 0.29 higher fertility rate in the model
than in the data.
Figure 3.8 shows the part- and full-time labor force participation and
child care enrollment rates grouped by the number of children which com-
prises the second set of targeted moments. The model does not generate the
observed decrease in the part-time labor force participation rate for females
with one child after period three and the full-time labor force participation
proﬁle is exactly reversed. In addition, though consistent with the mistake
for full-time labor force participation, full-time child care enrollment for
children aged three to six and a half is too high. The ﬁt for females with
two and three children is much better, in particular for labor force partici-
pation. Part-time enrollment for children aged zero to two is below actual
enrollment for n = 2 and n = 3. The part-time child care enrollment rate
for three children is too high while the children are of age three to six and a
half whereas full-time child care enrollment is too low compared to the data.
3.6.5 Comparative Statics
Setup To understand the role of the preference parameters, in this section
I undertake several comparative statics exercises. Every parameter change
has two eﬀects. First, conditional on the number of children labor par-
ticipation and child care enrollment decisions are aﬀected and second, the
birth decision might be altered. In this case, labor force participation and
child care enrollment decisions might diﬀer due to the change in the num-
ber of children. I therefore split the analysis in two parts by looking ﬁrst
at changes in the labor force participation and child care enrollment rate
without changing the number of children of a female. In a second step, the
impact on the fertility rate is investigated.
I increase each parameter by 5% leaving all remaining ones at their es-
timated or pre-speciﬁed values, cf. Table 3.8, and calculate the diﬀerence
between the new and baseline labor force participation/child care enroll-
ment/fertility rate. For the set of parameters of the ﬁrst part of the utility
function (Equation (3.2)), I only report results for the utility weights be-
cause the qualitative eﬀects are similar to those for the curvature parameters
35In future work, I will relax the restriction that females can get a maximum of three
children to ensure that n = 3 is not a corner solution.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 60
Figure 3.8: Model Fit – Part- and Full-time
Participation and Enrollment Rates by Number of Children
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while the quantitative diﬀerences are only small.
Female Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment
In this part of the exercise the number of children for each female is ﬁxed at
the value prior to a parameter change. Figure 3.9 presents the percentage
point diﬀerences between a set of model statistics at the new and baseline
preference parameters for pre-school children of age three to six and a half
(two upper panels) and for school children between 12.5 and 15.5 (lower
panel) which are representative for the remaining periods.
Consumption (δ0) Raising the utility from consumption by 5%, increases
full-time labor force participation rate compared to the baseline setup by
4.5 percentage points for females with children aged three to six and a half
(middle panel) and by 1.7 percentage points for females with children aged
12.5 to 15.5 (lower panel). This increase stems from females switching from
part- to full-time labor force participation and from previously non-employed
females that start to work part-time. A small fraction of the newly full-time
working females starts to use full-time child care (upper panel). Part-time
child care enrollment decreases however by more than that because females
save the costs from paid child care by substituting it with non-paid child
care.
Children (δ1) Receiving a higher utility from spending time with the
children leads to a drop in part-time labor force participation and a sub-
stitution from full-time towards part-time child care enrollment for the age
group three to six and a half because females simply spend more time with
their children. In the older age group, 12.5 to 15.5, there is no eﬀect on
female labor force participation since females already spend all time the
children are not in school with them. Hence, there is no margin to adjust.
The lower accumulation of experience for the females that stop to work in
the new setup reduces the incentives to work as the husband’s incomes fur-
ther increase. The eﬀect is however not strong enough to result in a lower
labor force participation rate.
Leisure (δ2) In all periods females switch from full- to part-time labor
force participation and from part-time labor force participation out of the
labor force as the weight on leisure increases. Along with the reduction in
labor force participation, but to a much smaller degree, full-time child care is
substituted with part-time child care. Those females do however not spend
more time with their children. They have decreased their labor supply andFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 62
Figure 3.9: Comparative Statics Exercise - Fixed Number of Children
Child Care Enrollment – Ages 3 to 6.5
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Part−time Full−time
Participation – Ages 3 to 6.5
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Part−time Full−time
Participation – Ages 12.5 to 15.5
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compensate the consumption decrease by substituting paid with non-paid
child care.
Non-Paid Child Care A larger weight on the costs of non-paid child
care (φ0) decreases the part-time labor force participation rate of females
with children aged three to six and a half by 0.8 percentage points and
increases child care enrollment. Full-time working females substitute part-
with full-time child care and in addition, more females use part-time child
care. Increasing the costs of non-paid child care for children from age three
to six and a half, φ1, has qualitatively and quantitatively a similar eﬀect as
increasing φ0. The parameter φ2 allows the costs of non-paid child care to be
increasing in the number of children and the larger value of this parameter
lets females of more than one child substitute part- by full-time child care.
Finally, note that for none of these three parameters an increase induces a
diﬀerent participation behavior once children entered school since the costs
of non-paid child care are assumed to aﬀect the females utility only while
the children are of pre-school age. The only feasible channel via the accu-
mulation of experience is not strong enough to result in a lower labor force
participation rate also later in life.
Summary Increasing a subset of the preference parameters by 5% and
holding the fertility decision constant at the pre-increase level changes the
behavior of only a small fraction of females in the directions one would a
priori except. A higher preference for consumption increases the labor force
participation rate while the opposite is true for a higher weight on leisure.
Females indeed spend more time with their children if this gains more im-
portance in the utility function. Higher costs of non-paid child care result
in a lower labor force participation rate and higher child care enrollment rate.
Fertility Rate Having analyzed the impact of a variation of the pa-
rameters holding the birth decision ﬁxed, Figure 3.10 shows the changes in
the fertility rate induced by a parameter increase. A higher weight on Con-
sumption (δ0) reduces the fertility rate since children are costly, whereas a
higher weight on the time spend with Children (δ1) is associated with an
increase by a similar magnitude. At the larger value of Leisure (δ2) females
increase their leisure by spending less time with their children which they
compensate by having an additional child resulting in a small increase in
the fertility rate, the quantity-quality trade-oﬀ. The cost of Non-Paid ChildFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 64
Figure 3.10: Comparative Statics Exercise – Fertility Rate
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Care have only an impact on fertility via the weight φ0. The increase of
the weight lets a small fraction of females spend more time with their child
instead of using non-paid child care. However, conditional on spending more
time with the children, the beneﬁts of an additional child outweigh the costs
in form of reduced consumption.
3.7 Experiments
3.7.1 East Germany
In Section 3.3 I documented diﬀerences between West and East Germany re-
garding the economic environment (provision and prices of subsidized child
care, income process) and the behavior (labor force participation, child care
enrollment). Which fraction of the diﬀerences in the behavior can be at-
tributed to the diﬀerences in the economic environment? To answer this
question, I simulate data using the model with the parameters estimated
with West German data but replace the West with the East German eco-
nomic environment.
Figure 3.11 compares labor force participation and child care enrollment
rates from the simulated data with the West and East German environment.
With the exception of the child care enrollment rates for children aged three
to six and a half, the diﬀerences between the “West” and “East” are only
small. This implies that the model in it’s current form is not able to explain
the actual East German data, see Figure 3.12.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 65
Figure 3.11: Model West vs. Model East
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Neither the labor force participation nor the child care enrollment rates
from the simulated data with the East German environment (labeled as
“Model”) come close to the data, which is also true for the rates grouped
by number of children (not shown). Note that this is not driven by the
endogenous fertility choice. Forcing females to have the same number of
children as in the West German setup does not alter the results qualitatively.
Since in the current experiment, three exogenous forces were changed –
the income processes (for males and females), prices and provision rates of
subsidized child care – it is diﬃcult to pin down the contribution of each
force. Therefore, in the experiment in the next subsection I only change one
of them. Let me remark that this result does not necessarily imply a failure
of the model. Alesina and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln (2007) ﬁnd that East Germans
are much more in favor of government redistribution and state interventions
than West Germans, which they attribute to the impact of communism on
shaping people’s preferences. This could also be case for the preferences
over consumption, children, leisure and non-paid child care in the two parts
of the country.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 66
Figure 3.12: Model East vs. Data East
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3.7.2 100% Subsidized Child Care Provision
To make the experiment as transparent as possible, I assume that each fe-
male has access to a subsidized full-time child care slot while the child care
prices and income remain unchanged at the West German values. The re-
sults are very similar as if I had replaced the West by the East German
provision rates. Figure 3.13 compares the outcome from the baseline model
as discussed in Section 3.6.4 with the new setup of unrestricted access to sub-
sidized full-time child care. The large increase in the child care enrollment
rate and the substitution of part- with full-time child care demonstrates that
there is indeed an excess demand for subsidized child care. However, females
simply substitute their own time spend with the children and/or non-paid
child care with paid child care whereas the eﬀect on the labor force par-
ticipation rate is very small. For females with children aged zero to two
the labor force participation rate increases by 1.4 percentage points, i.e. an
increase of 4.6%, and for females with children aged three to six and half by
0.6 percentage points, i.e. an increase of 1%. Still, these numbers are notFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 67
Figure 3.13: 100% Subsidized Child Care Provision
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far away from the estimates in Wrohlich (2006), although some caution is
needed because her ﬁgures refer to West and East Germany. She reports for
a similar policy experiment that the labor force participation rate of females
with children aged zero to two would rise by 2.8 percentage points, which
in her case implies an increase of 10%, and by 1.5 percentage points for all
females with children up to age ten.36
Table 3.12: 100% Subsidized Child Care Provision – Fertility
Fraction with n children Fertility
0 1 2 3 Rate
Baseline 0.0 35.7 30.2 34.1 1.98
07 Leave Beneﬁts 0.0 35.9 26.3 37.8 2.02
36Domeij and Klein (2009) ﬁnd a much larger response for the female labor force partic-
ipation rate for a similar experiment in the context of an overlapping generations model
with exogenous fertility for Germany compared to the results here and in Wrohlich (2006).Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 68
Finally, Table 3.12 shows the change in fertility resulting from the pro-
vision of subsidized full-time child care slots for all children. 0.2% get one
child less and 3.7% an additional child which increases the fertility by 0.04
children per female. Hank and Kreyenfeld (2003) estimate the eﬀect of child
care provision rates on the county level for West Germany on ﬁrst and sec-
ond birth risks and do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant impact of higher child care
provision rates on fertility, letting the small increase in the fertility rate from
this experiment appear plausible. To which extent the costs of increasing
the provision rate of subsidized full-time child care slots outweigh the social
beneﬁts from the increase in the labor force participation and fertility rate,
is out of the current scope of this paper.37
3.7.3 The 2007 Maternal Leave Beneﬁts
Since January 2007, females can receive for up to twelve months after birth
a monthly maternity leave beneﬁt of 67% of their pre-birth monthly net
income or 1800e – whatever is less. In this experiment, I replace the initial
maternity leave beneﬁt of 1583.91 e granted to all females with children
aged zero to two either not or part-time working with the new policy. As
net income I use one third of the after tax wage a female is oﬀered in that
period. Not surprisingly, part- and full-time labor force participation rates
for females with children aged zero to two decreases, see Figure 3.14. Child
care enrollment is hardly aﬀected. The labor force participation rate is
even higher by 1.1 percentage points for females with children aged three to
six and half. Additionally, the fertility rate increases by 0.04 children per
female because having more children becomes cheaper for females that were
already under the old policy not working. From the perspective of a policy
maker, the new maternity leave beneﬁt increases fertility and labor force
participation at least for one period.
3.8 Model Improvements
There are of course a lot of dimensions along which the model could be
improved. I want to point out those of them which seem to me the most
relevant and would not come along with a drastic change in the overall setup.
37For a treatment of this question, the reader is referred to Domeij and Klein (2009).Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 69
Figure 3.14: 2007 Maternity Leave Beneﬁts
Labor Force Participation and Child Care Enrollment Rates
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Table 3.13: 2007 Maternity Leave Beneﬁts – Fertility
Fraction with n children Fertility
0 1 2 3 Rate
Baseline 0.0 35.7 30.2 34.1 1.98
07 Leave Beneﬁts 0.0 33.8 30.2 36.0 2.02Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 70
Slot Assignment The assignment rule for subsidized child care slots
implies that any rejected slot is not ﬁlled with another potential applicant
despite the excess demand for subsidized child care. An allocation rule could
be constructed which lets only females draw from the lottery who will also
use a slot eventually. The actual child care provision rates could still be
used to determine the overall supply of slots while the success probabilities
would depend on the pool of applicants and thus be at least as big as the
provision rates. Such a setup would imply a deviation from a pure life cycle
setting and require the introduction of a rational expectations equilibrium
for the lottery participation. Going one step further, working females and
those with more children usually have a prioritized access to child care which
could also be captured by splitting up the lottery in several rounds.
Non-Paid Child Care All females are assumed to face the same func-
tion translating usage of non-paid child care in disutility. This assumption
might however downplay the role of paid child care as a substitute for ma-
ternal time to enable females to work. The comparative statics exercise on
the weight of non-paid child care costs φ0 showed that an increase results in
a higher usage of paid child care and lower labor force participation. Thus,
introducing heterogeneity in this weight could make labor force participa-
tion easier for females with lower costs and induce females with higher costs
to use paid child care. Allowing for heterogeneity in these costs does not
seem implausible. In reality, for some females the costs might be inﬁnity if
no relative is available that could take care of the children during the day
while for others they could be close to zero if they live under same roof with
their own or spouse’s retired parents.
Early School Years For children between age six and a half and 12.5,
the assumption of full-time schooling is not compatible with real schooling
hours. I made this assumption to accommodate that I do not allow for child
care enrollment in these age groups which in turn was necessary because
information on the availability of subsidized child care for this age group is
only available if provided outside but not within schools. This assumption
is responsible for the ﬂat proﬁle of the labor force participation rate for fe-
males of children in this age group while there is a smoother increase for
West Germany in the data. In addition, it could be argued that children inFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 71
this age group cannot be left alone such that for the usage of non-paid child
care still the costs would need to be incurred, in particular if schooling is
not to be assumed full-time anymore.
Last School Years For children from age 12.5 onwards I also assume
that children attend full-time schooling which is in line with reality. The
only eﬀect of schooling is to restrict the time females can spend with their
children. Since the children are in their teenage years by then and start
to develop more of an own life, it might be reasonable to restrict the time
females can spend with their children even further. This could potentially
also lead to a stronger increase in full-time labor force participation in these
periods since at the current estimates females spend all spare time of their
children with them.
Life Span East German females are on average at their ﬁrst/second/third
birth 3.6/3/2 years younger than West German females. This age diﬀerence
might also contribute to the diﬀerent labor force participation behavior, in
particular because pension payments upon retirement depend on contribu-
tions made throughout the life. This could be taken into account by making
the terminal value function dependent on accumulated experience and be
diﬀerent for West and East Germany.
3.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I documented facts about labor force participation and child
care enrollment decisions of married females in Germany. A particular em-
phasis was made on pointing out diﬀerences between West and East Ger-
many. I developed a stylized life-cycle model on female labor supply that
features endogenous fertility and takes child care choices explicitly into ac-
count. The model was estimated on data for West Germany and provides a
solid ﬁt although not all relevant moments were matched successfully. The
model was not able to explain the diﬀerences between West and East Ger-
many. Since a counterfactual policy experiment in which subsidized full-time
child care slots were provided for all children, delivered results close to those
in other studies, it is not clear whether the failure to explain the West-East
diﬀerences is due to a model miss-speciﬁcation or diﬀerent preferences be-Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 72
tween West and East German females. Finally, I outlined some dimensions
along which to improve the model.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 73
Appendix
A.1 Sample Selection
The following list contains all applied selection criteria and their exact def-
inition.
General criteria
1) Women born between 1955 and 1975, for those with children the child
identiﬁer has to be known.
2) Either born in Germany or born in another country as German citizen.
3) Only moves within West Germany for West German females or within
East Germany for East German females.
Mothers
4) Females for which it can be identiﬁed whether a child has been born
within a relationship.
• Identiﬁcation feasible if child born
(a) in the year before the ﬁrst interview or later.
(b) earlier than one year before the ﬁrst interview.
i. Case 1
– The female is married at the ﬁrst interview.
– The marriage started before the ﬁrst interview and the
actual starting date is known.
– The child is born within the marriage deﬁned as from
the year before the marriage started onwards.
ii. Case 2
– The female is in a relationship, married or cohabiting,
at the ﬁrst interview.
– The child is born more than one year
∗ before the ﬁrst interview was conducted or
∗ before the marriage started, in case the relationship
status at the ﬁrst interview is married.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 74
– The last observation is in 2000 or later because for
each child the father’s identiﬁer is known if the father
participated actively in the SOEP at least until 2000.
5) Births only in relationships.
• As in Todd and Wolpin (2006) births in the year before the start
of the relationship are treated as if they happened within the
relationship.
• For Case 2 of the previous criterion, criterion 5 is satisﬁed if the
partner at the ﬁrst interview is also the father of all children a
female has given birth to prior to the ﬁrst interview.
6) All births only in one relationship.
7) Relationship still intact at last interview.
Childless females
8) At age 39, i.e. prior to age 40, in a relationship that is still intact at
last interview.
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Table 3.14: Sample Selection in Detail
West Germany
Criterion General Mothers Childless40up
1 6610 . .
2 4949 . .
3 4909 2896 424
4 . 2868 .
5 . 2267 .
6 . 2229 .
7 . 1929 .
8 . . 177
9 . 1873 169
East Germany
Criterion General Mothers Childless40up
1 1763 . .
2 1725 . .
3 1565 1153 58
4 . 1112 .
5 . 780 .
6 . 770 .
7 . 653 .
8 . . 24
9 . 645 22Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 76
A.2 Sample Construction
A.2.1 Period Deﬁnition
Ages 0 to 2 I exclude the month of birth and the subsequent two months
to account for the mandatory maternity leave which outlaws females to work
in the ﬁrst eight weeks after the child is born. Depending on when the child
is born within a month this implies an exclusion of the ﬁrst eight to 13 weeks
of a child’s life. Thus, it is guaranteed that only the months in which it is
legally allowed to work contribute.38 Hence, by construction this period has
a duration of 2.75 years.
Ages 3 to 6.5 The second period lasts from the month in which the
child turns three until school entry. According to a cut-oﬀ rule, which is
very similar across all German states, children who are at least six in July
of a given year have to enter mandatory schooling. There are exceptions
permitting a child to enter school one year earlier or later. Because of some
peculiarities in the timing of the survey the age at school entry cannot always
be determined exactly and has to be constructed. I therefore assume that
for all children the cut-oﬀ date determines school entry but allow children
to enter school earlier if this is known from the survey. Even if the exact
entry age would be known, the length of the period is heterogenous among
children because school starts only once a year. The mean duration in the
data is 3.5 years.
A.2.2 Labor Force Participation
The GSOEP provides for every participant an employment spell history and
reports the starting and end month of each spell. The following spell types
exist:
1) Full-time Employment
2) Short-time Hours (Kurzarbeit)
3) Part-time Employment
4) Vocational Training
38Excluding only the month in which a child is born and the next month would corre-
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5) Unemployed
6) Retired
7) Maternity Leave
8) School, College
9) Military, Community Service
10) Housewife, Husband
11) Second Job
12) Other
13) First Job Training, Apprenticeship
14) Continuing Education, Retraining
15) Minijob (up to 400 Euro)
16) Gap (Missing Data)
Spells can overlap, e.g. a person could be working part-time and attend
college at the same time. While the spell history is obtained from the ret-
rospective monthly information, at each interview date the current labor
force status is also asked for. Similar to the spell history, more than one
answer is feasible. In these cases, the GSOEP provides a hierarchial order
to obtain the labor force status which I apply here as well. In brief, full-time
work dominates part-time work which dominates non-working.39 The labor
supply categories used in this paper are made up in the following way:
• Full-time work:
1, 4, 9, 13, 14. The latter four categories are included because they
are usually associated with a salary and require full-time labor force
participation.
• Part-time work:
2, 3, 11, 15
• Non-working:
5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15
39For details see http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/60055/pgen.pdf.Fertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 78
A.2.3 Child Care Enrollment
The GSOEP does not have the categories of subsidized and non-subsidized
child care as I use them. Prior to 1995, it was only asked for enrollment
in child care. From 1995 onwards a distinction between daycare centers
and nannies was made. Since daycare centers are usually subsidized and
nannies not, I use this deﬁnition to distinguish between subsidized and non-
subsidized child care. Between 1995 and 1999 the distinction between day-
care centers and nannies was exclusive and from 2000 onwards non-exclusive.
Furthermore, for care provided by nannies from 2004 onwards part- and
full-time can not be distinguished anymore. I therefore only calculate the
following two variables. First, child care enrollment comprising subsidized
(daycare centers) and non-subsidized (nannies) child care for all years which
can be part- or full-time. Second from the year 1995 onwards the fraction
of children enrolled in non-subsidized child care (nannies) from all children
enrolled in child care (daycare centers and/or nannies).
Information on the child care enrollment status for each child is only
available at the interview date. Therefore, the child care enrollment status
has to be imputed for the other months of the year which will be based on the
following reasoning: Since school starts at the same time for all children, the
oldest cohort in a daycare center usually leaves the daycare center together
at the same time of the year, i.e. at the end of the ﬁrst half of the year.
Therefore the majority of entries into daycare centers occurs at the beginning
of the second half of the year. Hence, the child care enrollment status in the
ﬁrst half of a year is a good predictor for the status in the second half of
the previous year. Similarly, the child care enrollment status in the second
half of a year is a good predictor for the child care enrollment status in ﬁrst
half of the next year. In the following the detailed imputation procedure
will be described. The child care enrollment status in the interview month
is assumed to be the same in all other months of a half year. The second
half of a year and the ﬁrst half of the next year have the same status in
case no new information is available. To make that point more clearly, if the
interview month is in the ﬁrst half of the year, which is the case for more
than 90% of the interviews, I use this child care enrollment status also for
the second half of the previous year if no interview has been conducted in
the second half of the previous year. Analogously, if the interview month is
in the second half of the year I use this child care enrollment status also forFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 79
the ﬁrst half of the next year if no interview is conducted in the ﬁrst half of
the next year. Finally, in all other cases the last known child care enrollment
status is used until one of the two described situation occurs. Although this
reasoning applies more to child care provided in daycare centers, I use the
same imputation rule for child care provided by nannies.
A.3 Stylized Facts
A.3.1 Child Care Fees
Information on child care fees is available in the GSOEP only in the years
1987, 1996, 2002 and 2005. Moreover, 1987 cannot be used because of the
missing distinction between nannies and daycare centers and in 2005 fees are
only reported for daycare centers. Because of these rare number of years,
the child care prices used in the model will be obtained from the full GSOEP
sample and not only the selected sample.
The per child fees reported in Table 3.2 are determined by a regression
on a set of corresponding dummy variables and were run separately for West
and East Germany for subsidized child care but not for non-subsidized child
care. In the regression for subsidized child care cross-sectional weights were
used. For non-subsidized child care I refrained from doing so due to the low
number of observations. In both regressions only those children, for which
a positive fee was reported, were included.
A.3.2 Provision Rate of Subsidized Child Care
The slot provision rates are calculated from the data provided by Statis-
tische Bundesamt (Statistik der Jugendhilfe, various years). They are only
available for a subset of years (West Germany: 1986, 1990; East Germany:
1991; Both parts: 1994, 1998 and 2002) and change over time. Tables 3.16
shows the annual averages over the years 1983 to 2006, the period for which
the monthly labor supply status from the GSOEP is available. These aver-
ages are constructed for the two age groups (zero to two, three to six and
half) and the two regions (West and East) as follows: Years before the ear-
liest observation of the slot provision rates, i.e. 1983 to 1985 in the West
and 1989 to 1990 in the East, will be assigned the same value as the ﬁrst
observation of the slot provision rate (1986/1991). Similarly, years after theFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 80
last observation, i.e. 2003 to 2006, will be assigned the same value as the
last observation (2002). For the years between two observations the mean
of the corresponding two observations will be used. The overall provision
rates are then obtained as the mean over all years. From 1994 onwards
the provision rates can be further distinguished by part- and full-time from
which the fraction of full-time slots from all slots, the full-time share, will
be calculated. As for the overall provision rate, the full-time share before
the ﬁrst and after the last observed data points are extrapolated and be-
tween two observation interpolated. The annual provision rate of part- and
full-time slot is then given by the provision rate of slots times the fraction
of part- or full-time slots from all slots. The mean over all these years then
ﬁnally gives the average provision rate of part- and full-time slots.
These rates are used to construct the success probabilities for the slot
lottery. If a females would have only one draw from the slot lottery at
age zero and age three, the provision rates could be immediately used as
model input. There is however no way to determine how often mothers
apply for a slot within a period whereas in the model they only have a
single draw for each age group. I therefore transform the observed provision
rates into period equivalents in the following way: As already described for
the imputation of the child care status, the majority of entries into daycare
centers happens once a year. In addition, new information on the child care
enrollment status is available once a year. Therefore I assume that a female
can apply once per year for a slot. If she gets a slot, she can send her child
there until it reaches age three and has to apply again for a slot or goes
to school. Put diﬀerently, in each year a female can draw once from the
lottery and a successful draw implies that the slot is open for the remainder
of the period, i.e. until age three is reached or the child enters school. Once
a full-time slot is drawn, the female does not have to redraw until the end of
the period. Drawing a part-time slot implies that the female can redraw but
success is then deﬁned only as drawing a full-time slot because she already
has access to a part-time slot for the rest of the period. Since a model
period corresponds to three years I assume that within a period there is a
maximum of three draws which leads to the set of possible access histories
displayed in the left panel of Table 3.15.
Consider the case that a female would always use as much subsidized
child care as she can get access to. In line with the deﬁnition for periodFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 81
Table 3.15: Access to Subsidized Child Care
Access in Year Period Access History
1 2 3 Mean Status Probability
No No No 0 No (1 − PP − PF)3
No No Part 1/6 No (1 − PP − PF)2PP
No No Full 1/3 Part (1 − PP − PF)2PF
No Part Part 1/3 Part (1 − PP − PF)PP(1 − PF)
No Part Full 1/2 Part (1 − PP − PF)PPPF
No Full Full 2/3 Part (1 − PP − PF)PF
Part Part Part 1/2 Part PP(1 − PF)2
Part Part Full 2/3 Part PP(1 − PF)PF
Part Full Full 5/6 Full PPPF
Full Full Full 1 Full PF
child care enrollment status in each year no slot is assigned a 0, part- and
full-time slots with 1
2 and 1. The mean over the whole period - the three years
- would be given in column 4 in Table 3.15 whereas column 5 corresponds to
the associated child care enrollment status for each possible access history
using the same thresholds as before (0.25 and 0.75). Since I assume that a
females does not have to use the slot she has drawn access to for some part
of the period or at all, columns 4 and 5 state the period access status as
opposed to the period enrollment status. Column 6 displays the probability
of observing a speciﬁc access history. PP and PF are the probabilities of
drawing a part- or full-time slot in a given year and correspond to the
observed slot provision rates which diﬀer by region and age. Finally, the
probability for having access to no, a part- or full-time slot over the whole
period is equal to the sum of the history probabilities that are associated
with the respective period access status. For example, the probability to
have no slot as deﬁned by the period access status would be the sum over
the two ﬁrst histories ([No, No, No]; [No, No, Part-time]) and equal
to (1 − PP − PF)3 + (1 − PP − PF)2PP. Table 3.16 presents the annual,
i.e. observed, slot provision rates and the period provision rates after theFertility, Female Labor Supply and Child Care 82
transformation. E.g. while there are 1.2 part-time and 40.6 full-time slots
per 100 children up to age two in East Germany, the probability for an East
German female that she has access to a part-time slot over the whole period
where the child is between zero and two is 38.8% and 41.1% for a full-time
slot. Note that by construction, the period provision rates have to be larger
than the annual/observed provision rates (for children aged zero to two in
West Germany this also the case for the non-rounded numbers).
Table 3.16: Annual and Period Provision Rates
of Subsidized Child Care Slots
West East
Annual Period Annual Period
Ages 0 to 2
Part-time 0.5 4.3 1.2 38.8
⇒ ⇒
Full-time 1.7 1.7 40.6 41.1
Ages 3 to 6.5
Part-time 62.3 71.8 1.8 2.4
⇒ ⇒
Full-time 14.6 23.7 95.9 97.6Bibliography
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